When Villeneuve, with his ill-trained and sickly[103] fleet, left Martinique on the 4th of June, he had, of course, no knowledge of Nelson’s approach.  Nearly up to that date it was not known, even in London, where the latter had gone.  A frigate had reached the French admiral on the 29th of May, with orders from Napoleon to make some attempts against the British islands during the time he was awaiting the Brest squadron.  For this reason he sailed, and just outside the harbor was joined by two ships from France, raising his force to twenty of the line.  He steered north, intending to gain to windward, and thence return upon Barbadoes, his first proposed conquest.  On the 8th of June, off Antigua, were captured fourteen British merchant-ships, which had imprudently put to sea from that island.  From these Villeneuve got a report that Nelson had arrived with fourteen ships-of-the-line, to which his imagination added five he believed to be at Barbadoes.  He decided at once to return to Europe, abandoning all his projects against the British possessions.  Transferring hastily a number of troops to frigates, as garrisons for the French islands, he sailed the next day for the northward to gain the westerly winds which prevail in the higher latitudes.  Of the forty days he was to remain in the West Indies—­reduced to thirty-five by subsequent instructions—­only twenty-six had passed.  Whatever else might result in the future, Nelson was justified in claiming that his pursuit, effected under such discouragements, had driven the enemy out of the West Indies, saved the islands, and, as he added, two hundred sail of sugar ships.  Only extreme imprudence, he fairly maintained, was responsible for the loss of the fourteen from Antigua.

Nelson himself was off Antigua on the 12th of June, exactly one week after he left Barbadoes.  There he received all the information that has just been mentioned as to the enemy’s movements.  A rapid decision was necessary, if he might hope yet to overtake his fortune, and to baffle finally the objects of the allies, whatever they might be.  “I must be satisfied they have bent their course for Europe before I push after them, which will be to the Straits’ mouth;” but later in the same day he has learned that they were standing to the northward when last seen, and had sent back their troops to Guadaloupe, therefore, “I hope to sail in the morning after them for the Straits’ mouth.”  That night the troops were landed, and a brig of war, the “Curieux,” was despatched to England with word of his intentions.  At the same time, while believing the allies were bound back to the Mediterranean, he recognized that it was possible they might be going farther north, to one of the Biscay ports, and consequently took measures to notify the commanding officer off Ferrol to be on his guard.  The frigate charged with this communication was kept with the fleet until the 19th, by which time he had obtained at sea additional and more precise knowledge of Villeneuve’s direction.  This important warning was duly received, and in advance of the enemy’s appearance, by the admiral for whom it was intended.