Mediterranean,” he wrote the Admiralty, “I hope that their Lordships will not impute it to any want of due attention on my part; but, on the contrary, that by my vigilance the enemy found it was impossible to undertake any expedition in the Mediterranean.”  Mindful, also, that Bonaparte’s great attempt of 1798 had depended upon the absence of the British fleet, he left a squadron of five frigates to cruise together to the windward of Sicily, lest the French even now might try to send transports with troops to the eastward, under the protection of small armed vessels.

The number of letters written on the 18th and 19th of April show how thoroughly his mind was prepared for contingencies.  Despatched, in all directions, they outline his own intended course, for the information of those who might have to co-operate, as well as that which he wished to be pursued by the officers under his orders.  They are issued neat and complete, at one cast, and no other follows for a week.  He surmises, from the fact of the Spanish ships accompanying the movement, that it is directed, not against the West Indies, but for either Ireland or Brest; not a bad “guess,” which is all he would have claimed for it, for the West Indies were actually only a rallying-point on the roundabout road to the Channel prescribed by Napoleon.  “Therefore,” he wrote to the Admiralty, “if I receive no intelligence to do away my present belief, I shall proceed from Cape St. Vincent, and take my position fifty leagues west from Scilly, approaching that island slowly, that I may not miss any vessels sent in search of the squadron with orders.  My reason for this position is, that it is equally easy to get to either the fleet off Brest, or to go to Ireland, should the fleet be wanted at either station.”  The suitableness of this position to any emergency arising about the British Islands can be realized at a glance, bearing in mind that westerly winds prevail there.  A copy of the letter was sent to Ireland, and another to the commander of the Channel fleet off Brest.  “I have the pleasure to say,” he concludes, “that I shall bring with me eleven as fine ships of war, as ably commanded, and in as perfect order, and in health, as ever went to sea.”

It will be interesting to support even Nelson’s opinion of his own squadron by that of an unbiassed and competent witness.  Sir Edward Codrington was associated with it, still nearly entire, some three months later, after the return from the West Indies; the “Orion,” which he commanded, being one of a detachment of eighteen ships-of-the-line sent off from Brest by Admiral Cornwallis.  “Lord Nelson’s squadron (of which we have now eight with us) seems to be in very high order indeed; and although their ships do not look so handsome as objects, they look so very warlike and show such high condition, that when once I can think Orion fit to manoeuvre with them, I shall probably paint her in the same manner.”  There was, it would seem, a Nelson pattern for painting ships, as well as a “Nelson touch” in Orders for Battle.  “I have been employed this week past,” wrote Captain Duff of the “Mars,” “to paint the ship a la Nelson, which most of the fleet are doing.”  This, according to the admiral’s biographers, was with two yellow streaks, but the portholes black, which gave the sides an appearance of being chequered.