Following up the success at Acre, a Turkish fleet of thirteen ships-of-the-line anchored in Aboukir Bay on the 11th of July, attended by a body of transports carrying troops, variously estimated at from ten to thirty thousand.  Smith with his ships accompanied the expedition.  The Turks landed, and stormed the castle of Aboukir; but on the 25th Bonaparte, having concentrated his forces rapidly, fell upon them and totally defeated them.  All who had landed were either killed, driven into the sea and drowned, or taken prisoners; the commander-in-chief being among the latter.  Four weeks later, as is already known, Bonaparte embarked for France.

It was thus conclusively demonstrated that for the present at least, and until the French numbers were further diminished by the inevitable losses of disease and battle, the Turks could not regain control of Egypt.  On the other hand, it was equally evident, and was admitted by both Bonaparte and his able successor, Kleber, that without reinforcements, which could not be sent while the British controlled the sea, the end of the French occupation was only a question of time.  After Bonaparte’s departure, Kleber wrote home strongly to this effect.  His letters, being addressed to the Government, fell upon arrival into Bonaparte’s hands; but, with these convictions, he was ready to enter into an arrangement for the evacuation of the country, upon condition of being allowed to return freely to Europe.

Such also appears to have been the disposition of the British representatives in the East.  Immediately after taking over the command in the Levant from Troubridge, Smith gave him, among other papers, a form of passport which he intended to use, permitting individual Frenchmen to go to Europe by sea.  This Troubridge handed to Nelson, telling him also that it was Smith’s intention to send word into Alexandria, that all French ships might pass to France.  This passport, adopted after Smith had been to Constantinople, had doubtless the sanction of the joint minister, his brother, and was signed by himself both as plenipotentiary and naval officer.  Nelson had by this time been instructed that Smith was under his command, and he at once sent him an order, couched in the most explicit, positive, and peremptory terms, which merit especial attention because Smith disobeyed them. “As this is in direct opposition to my opinion, which is, never to suffer any one individual Frenchman to quit Egypt—­I must therefore strictly charge and command you,[2] never to give any French ship or man leave to quit Egypt.  And I must also desire that you will oppose by every means in your power, any permission which may he attempted to be given by any foreigner, Admiral, General, or other person; and you will acquaint those persons, that I shall not pay the smallest attention to any such passport after your notification; and you are to put my orders in force, not on any pretence to permit a single Frenchman to leave Egypt.”  It seems clear from these expressions that Nelson had gathered, through Troubridge, that it was the policy of the Sultan and of the British representatives to get the French out of Egypt at any cost,—­to look, in short, to local interests rather than to the general policy of the Allies.  This he was determined to prevent by instructions so comprehensive, yet so precise, as to leave no loophole for evasion.