and on time, if the great combination, of which they were parts, was to advance to a triumphant conclusion.  This emphasized to the British the importance, which Nelson always so keenly felt, of meeting the enemy immediately after they left port.  Once away, and their destination in doubt, the chances in favor of any scheme were multiplied.  In their greatest and final effort, Cornwallis, off Brest, was fortunate, in that the plans of the Emperor first, and afterwards unusual weather conditions, retained the French fleet there in harbor; a result to which the material efficiency of his own ships, and their nearness to their base, much contributed.

Upon Nelson, with his crazy ships, on the other hand, fell the burden of counteracting a successful evasion of the Toulon fleet, of foiling, by sagacious and untiring pursuit, through immense and protracted discouragements, the efforts of the one division which had been committed to his watch.  Although it became much superior to his own force, he drove it out of the position in the West Indies first appointed for the meeting, followed it back to Europe, arrived before it, and then, finding it had gone to Ferrol, carried his squadron, without orders, counselled simply by his own genius, to the aid of Cornwallis; by which act the British navy, to the number of thirty-five ships-of-the-line, was massed in a central position, separating the two enemy’s bodies, and able to act decisively against a foe approaching from either direction.  Thus a second time he prevented the enemy from forming a junction, unless they fought for it—­an alternative Napoleon wished to avoid.  To him fell all the strain of uncertainty, all the doubtful and complicated mental effort, all the active strategic movement, of the campaign, and to him consequently has been attributed justly the greater meed of glory; though care must be taken not to ignore or undervalue the well-played parts of other admirals, which were essential to the success of the great defensive campaign comprehended under the name Trafalgar.

The point selected by the Emperor for the meeting of his naval divisions, in both the unsuccessful attempts made in 1805, was the West Indies.  There was the most powerful foreign arsenal, Martinique, left in the hands of France, and there the greatest single interest of the wide-spread commerce upon which depended the life of Great Britain.  The latter, therefore, was specially sensitive to anything threatening the safety of the West India Islands.  “I should think the West Indies the more likely place for the French to succeed in,” wrote Nelson to Ball, on the 6th of September, 1804.  “Suppose the Toulon fleet escapes, and gets out of the Straits, I rather think I should bend my course to the westward; for if they carry 7,000 men—­with what they have at Martinico and Guadaloupe—­St. Lucia, Grenada, St. Vincent, Antigua, and St. Kitts would fall, and, in that case, England would be so clamorous for peace that we should humble ourselves.”