NELSON AND BRONTE.

This letter fulfils his own request to the Admiralty:  “All I wish and submit to their Lordships is, that if the business is left to me, my orders may be decisive.”

Later in the same day that Nelson received Gore’s letter, the Admiralty’s orders arrived, sent, as despatches too often were, by a vessel so small and slow that it would seem they counted upon her insignificance to elude an enemy’s notice.  The delay served, as has been said, to give proof of the rapidity of Nelson’s action; the receipt of the orders enabled him also to show how much clearer were his conceptions of adequacy than those of ordinary men.  To stop treasure-ships, or to embargo merchant-ships, when difficulty was threatening, was no new idea to the British Government.  The latter had been done with Baltic merchantmen at the time of the Armed Neutrality.  In the case of Spain, it was a measure particularly efficacious, for the financial solvency and belligerent capacity of that country depended upon the galleons, which brought to her the tribute of her colonies; and her relations and dealings with France at this time were so partial and suspicious as to justify precautions.  Evidently, however, such a step, being avowedly preventive and not offensive, should be taken in such a way as to avert all chance of possible disaster.  Several Spanish frigates being expected, the British Government charged four vessels of the same rate with the task of arresting them.  Nelson, the instant he got his orders, detached to the spot an eighty-gun ship, to which he added four other cruisers, thinking, as he said in his orders to the captain selected, that “this is a service of the highest importance, and that an officer of your rank and experience should be employed therein.”  With such odds against him, the Spanish commander would need no military justification for submission.  As it was, he resisted, necessitating a fight, which under the circumstances was barbarous and brutal, and ended in one of the Spanish vessels blowing up with several women on board; a result due wholly to the blundering lack of foresight which sent a corporal’s guard to do the work of a sheriff’s posse.

This incident, of the order to arrest the treasure-ships, which was made general for all vessels of that class, was probably the determining occasion of Nelson’s decision to remain in the Mediterranean.  War with Spain, with consequent increased activity on the part of France, though not certain, became probable.  There was at that time on board the “Victory” a Dr. Lambton Este, who had gone to the Mediterranean in a civil capacity, and was on his way home.  Nelson, hoping to return soon himself, asked Este to remain until he started, and to accompany him in a worn-out seventy-four, the “Superb,” which he was holding for that purpose.  It seems that, in looking forward to the resumption of his command, he expected it would be the scene of a more wide-spread political activity, especially in the far East where Este had been employed, and that, for this purpose, he wished to attach the latter to his person.  “There may be more occupation there for us all, hereafter, than we just now foresee, or may expect.”