All these communications were, of course, tentative, based upon a yet imperfect knowledge of conditions.  For the most part they conveyed, besides the notification of his having taken the command, chiefly general assurances of the good-will of the writer’s government, and an undefined intimation that all had best be on their guard against French scheming and aggressions.  To Naples he spoke more definitely, and indicated at once the considerations that would dictate his course, and, he intimated, should control theirs also.  He had been instructed, he said, to consider the welfare of the Two Sicilies as one of the first of British objects, and his Government was convinced of the advantages that would accrue both to Sicily and Naples, if their neutrality could be maintained.  They had to do, however, with an enemy that was not only powerful, but wily and unscrupulous; one whose action would be governed wholly by considerations of interest and expediency, not by those of right.  Great Britain could not, probably, keep the French out of Naples, but she could out of Sicily, provided, and only provided, Messina was adequately garrisoned and held.  If, however, there was any hasty overt action taken, looking to the security of Sicily, it might merely precipitate the seizure of Naples and the entire conquest of the King’s continental dominions; or, “ten times more humiliating,” leave him “an odious commissary to raise contributions from his unhappy subjects for the French.”  On the other hand, if, to avert suspicion, there was too much slackness in the measures to guard Sicily, Messina might be suddenly seized, the gates of the island thus thrown open, and, Sicily once lost, “Naples falls of course.”  “It is a most important point,” he wrote to Elliot soon after, “to decide when Sicily ought to be placed in a state of security.  For the present, I am content to say that Messina need not be taken possession of; but the strictest watch must be kept by Sir John Acton that we are not lulled into a fatal security, and thus lose both Kingdoms.  To save for the moment Naples, we risk the two Kingdoms, and General Acton must join me in this heavy responsibility.”  “My whole opinion rests in these few words—­that we must not risk Sicily too far in trying to save Naples; therefore, General Acton, yourself and myself must keep a good lookout.”

This summed up the conditions for Naples during the long two years of watching and waiting, while Bonaparte, concentrating his purposes upon his invasion scheme, was content to leave things quiet in the South.  To check, as far as might be, the designs of the French towards Morea or towards Sicily, on either side of the central position they held at the heel of Italy, Nelson employed a proportionately large number of cruisers—­five—­between Messina and the mouth of the Adriatic; while, to provide for the safety of the royal family, he kept always a ship-of-the-line in the Bay of Naples, the British minister holding