On the 18th of March Hood summoned him to San Fiorenzo.  The difference between him and Dundas had become a quarrel, and the latter had quitted his command.  Hood wished to strengthen the argument with his successor, by a report of the observations made by Nelson; but the latter records that, after expressing his opinion that eight hundred troops with four hundred seamen could reduce the place, it was found that all the army was united against an attack, declaring the impossibility of taking Bastia, even if all the force were united,—­and this, notwithstanding that an engineer and an artillery officer had visited the scene, and agreed with Nelson that there was a probability of success.  On the north side both they and he considered the place weak, and at the same time found the ground favorable for establishing the siege guns.  Moreover, even during the winter gales, he had succeeded in so closing the sea approaches, while the revolted Corsicans intercepted those by land, that a pound of coarse bread was selling for three francs.  The spring equinox was now near at hand, and with better weather the blockade would be yet more efficient.  Between actual attack and famine, he argued, the place must fall.  “Not attacking it I could not but consider as a national disgrace.  If the Army will not take it, we must, by some way or other.”

If every particular operation of war is to be considered by itself alone, and as a purely professional question, to be determined by striking a balance between the arguments pro and con, it is probable that the army officers were right in their present contention.  In nothing military was scientific accuracy of prediction so possible as in forecasting the result and duration of a regular siege, where the force brought to bear on either side could be approximately known.  But, even in this most methodical and least inspired of processes, the elements of chance, of the unforeseen, or even the improbable, will enter, disturbing the most careful calculations.  For this reason, no case must be decided purely on its individual merits, without taking into account the other conditions of the campaign at large.  For good and sufficient reasons, the British had undertaken, not to conquer a hostile island, but to effect the deliverance of a people who were already in arms, and had themselves redeemed their country with the exception of two or three fortified seaports, for the reduction of which they possessed neither the materials nor the technical skill.  To pause in the movement of advance was, with a half-civilized race of unstable temperament, to risk everything.  But besides, for the mere purpose of the blockade, it was imperative to force the enemy as far as possible to contract his lines.  Speaking of a new work thrown up north of the town, Nelson said with accurate judgment:  “It must be destroyed, or the Corsicans will be obliged to give up a post which the enemy would immediately possess; and of course throw us on that side at a greater distance from Bastia.”  The result would be, not merely so much more time and labor to be expended, nor yet only the moral effect on either party, but also the uncovering of a greater length of seaboard, by which supplies might be run into the town.