step for which he was severely, but apparently unjustly, censured by Nelson.  The peasantry and the lower orders of the city took up arms, under the guidance of their priests, and for some time sought, with rude but undisciplined fury, to oppose the advance of the enemy; but such untrained resistance was futile before the veterans of France, and on the 23d of January, 1799, Championnet’s troops entered the city.  This was followed by the establishment of the Parthenopeian Republic, a name which reflected the prevailing French affectation of antiquity.  For all this Nelson blamed the Emperor, and formed gloomy forebodings.  “Had the war commenced in September or October,” he had written amid the December disasters, “all Italy would at this moment have been liberated.  Six months hence, when the Neapolitan Republic will be organized, armed, and with its numerous resources called forth, I will suffer to have my head cut off, if the Emperor is not only defeated in Italy, but that he totters on his throne in Vienna.”  To this text he stuck.  Three months later, when the preparations of Austria and Russia were complete, he wrote:  “The French have made war upon the Emperor, and have surprised some of his troops.  Serve him right! why did he not go to war before?” But the rapid, continuous, and overwhelming successes of the Coalition, between April and August, showed how untimely had been the step he had urged upon the King of the Sicilies, disregardful of the needed preparations and of the most favorable season—­February to August—­for operations in Italy.  Naples never recovered such political equilibrium as she had possessed before that ill-advised advance.  In Nelson’s career it, and its reverses, were to the Battle of the Nile what Teneriffe was to St. Vincent; and it illustrates the inadequacy to success of merely “going ahead,” unless both time and method are dictated by that martial intelligence which Nelson so abundantly possessed, but in this case failed to use.

Not in Naples only did fortune now administer to him rebuffs, which seemed singularly to rebuke the change of direction and of base which he had been persuaded to give to his personal efforts.  Immediately upon his arrival in Palermo, he heard from St. Vincent that a comparatively junior captain, Sir Sidney Smith, had been sent out by the Cabinet, bearing, besides his naval commission from the Admiralty, one from the Foreign Office as envoy to Turkey, conjointly with his brother, Spencer Smith.  This unusual and somewhat cumbrous arrangement was adopted with the design that Smith should be senior naval officer in the Levant, where it was thought his hands would be strengthened by the diplomatic functions; but the Government’s explanation of its intentions was so obscure, that St. Vincent understood the new-comer was to be independent of both himself and Nelson.  This impression was confirmed by a letter from Smith to Hamilton, in which occurred the words, “Hood naturally falls under my orders when we meet, as being my junior,” while the general tone was that of one who had a right, by virtue of his commission alone, to take charge of such vessels, and to direct such operations, as he found in the Levant.  This impression was fairly deducible from a letter of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that Smith forwarded to Nelson; after which, without seeking an interview, he at once went on for Constantinople.