vessels at the centre.  The flagship “Orient,” of one hundred and twenty guns, was seventh in the order; next ahead and astern of her were, respectively, the “Franklin” and the “Tonnant,” each of eighty.  By a singular misconception, however, he had thought that any attack would fall upon the rear—­the lee flank; and to this utter misapprehension of the exposed points it was owing that he there placed his next heaviest ships.  Nelson’s fore-determined onslaught upon the van accordingly fell on the weakest of the French vessels.

Such was the French order of battle.  The proceedings of the British fleet, under its leader, show an instructive combination of rapidity and caution, of quick comprehension of the situation, with an absence of all precipitation; no haste incompatible with perfect carefulness, no time lost, either by hesitation or by preparations postponed.  When the enemy were first discovered, two ships, the “Alexander” and “Swiftsure,” were a dozen miles to leeward, having been sent ahead on frigates’ duty to reconnoitre Alexandria.  This circumstance prevented their joining till after the battle began and night had fallen.  At the same moment the “Culloden” was seven miles to windward.  She was signalled to drop the prize she was towing, and to join the fleet.  To this separation was due that she went aground.  The remaining ten ships, which had been steering about east, hauled sharp on the wind to enable them to weather with ample allowance the shoal off Aboukir Island.  It was blowing a whole-sail breeze, too fresh for the lighter canvas; the royals were furled as soon as close-hauled.  As the French situation and dispositions developed to the view, signals were made to prepare for battle, to get ready to anchor by the stern, and that it was the admiral’s intention to attack the van and centre of the enemy.  The captains had long been forewarned of each of these possibilities, and nothing more was needed to convey to them his general plan, which was intrusted to them individually to carry out as they successively came into action.

At about half-past five signal was given to form line of battle.  This, for the ships of the day, was a single column, in which they were ranged ahead and astern of each other, leaving the broadside clear.  As they came abreast the shoal, Nelson hailed Captain Hood, of the “Zealous,” and asked if he thought they were yet far enough to the eastward to clear it, if they then headed for the enemy.  Hood replied that he did not know the ground, but was in eleven fathoms, and would, if the admiral allowed, bear up and sound with the lead, and would not bring the fleet into danger.  This was done, Hood leading all the fleet except the “Goliath,” Captain Foley, which kept ahead, but outside, of the “Zealous.”  No close shaving was done, however, at this critical turn; and it is that steady deliberation, combined with such parsimony of time in other moments, which is most impressive in Nelson.  So few realize