The position of the French fleet, and the arrangements made by its commander, Admiral Brueys, must now be given, for they constitute the particular situation against which Nelson’s general plan of attack was to be directed.  Considering it impracticable for the ships-of-the-line to enter the port of Alexandria, Brueys had taken the fleet on the 8th of July to their present anchorage.  Aboukir Bay begins at a promontory of the same name, and, after curving boldly south, extends eastward eighteen miles, terminating at the Rosetta mouth of the Nile.  From the shore the depth increases very gradually, so that water enough for ships-of-the-line was not found till three miles from the coast.  Two miles northeast of the promontory of Aboukir is Aboukir Island, since called Nelson’s, linked with the point by a chain of rocks.  Outside the island, similar rocks, with shoals, prolong this foul ground under water to seaward, constituting a reef dangerous to a stranger approaching the bay.  This barrier, however, broke the waves from the northwest, and so made the western part of the bay a fairly convenient summer roadstead.  The French fleet was anchored there, under the shelter of the island and rocks, in an order such that “the wind blew nearly along the line.”  Its situation offered no local protection against an enemy’s approach, except that due to ignorance of the ground.

It was therefore Brueys’s business to meet this defect of protection by adequate dispositions; and this he failed to do.  Numerically his force was the same as Nelson’s; but, while the latter had only seventy-fours, there were in the French fleet one ship of one hundred and twenty guns, and three eighties.  In a military sense, every line divides naturally into three parts,—­the centre, and the two ends, or flanks; and it is essential that these should so far support one another that an enemy cannot attack any two in superior force, while the third is unable to assist.  Shallow water, such as was found in Aboukir Bay, if properly utilized, will prevent a flank being turned, so that an enemy can get on both sides of the ships there, or otherwise concentrate upon them, as by enfilading; and if, in addition, the ships are anchored close to each other, it becomes impossible for two of the attacking force to direct their fire upon one of the defence, without being exposed to reprisals from those next astern and ahead.  These evident precautions received no illustration in the arrangements of Admiral Brueys.  The general direction of his line was that of the wind, from northwest to southeast, with a very slight bend, as shown in the diagram.  The leading—­northwestern—­ship was brought close to the shoal in thirty feet of water, but not so close as to prevent the British passing round her, turning that flank; and there were between the successive ships intervals of five hundred feet, through any one of which an enemy could readily pass.  Brueys had very properly accumulated his most powerful