account; you see fairly our position; will Admiral Nelson run to the Levant again without knowing for certain the position of the French, and leave the Two Sicilies exposed in these moments?  Buonaparte has absconded himself, but in any port he has taken securitys not to be forced.  God knows where he is, and whether we shall not see him again in a few days, if we do not hear of what a course he has taken.  I present all this to your consideration.”  To this letter, which oddly enough was written on the very day the Battle of the Nile was fought, Nelson might well have replied then, as he did in terms a year afterwards, “The best defence for His Sicilian Majesty’s dominions is to place myself alongside the French fleet.”

The fleet left Syracuse on the 25th of July, just one week before the discovery of the enemy in Aboukir Bay put an end to Nelson’s long suspense.  The course was first shaped for the southern capes of the Morea, and on the 28th Troubridge was sent into the Gulf of Koron for information.  He returned within three hours, with the news that the French had been seen four weeks before from the coast of Candia, and were then steering southeast.  This intelligence was corroborated by a vessel spoken the same day.  Southeast, being nearly dead before the prevailing wind, was an almost certain clew to the destination of an unwieldy body which could never regain ground lost to leeward; so, although Nelson now learned that some of his missing frigates had also been seen recently off Candia, he would waste no time looking for them.  It may be mentioned that these frigates had appeared off the anchorage of the French fleet, and had been recognized by it as enemies; but, so far from taking warning from the incident, the French admiral was only confirmed by it in a blind belief that the British feared to attack.  Immediately after Troubridge’s return, the fleet bore up under all sail, and at 2.45 in the afternoon of the 1st of August, 1798, the masthead lookout of the “Zealous” discovered the long-sought-for enemy, lying in Aboukir Bay, on the coast of Egypt, fifteen miles east of Alexandria.

Suspense was ended, but Nelson’s weightiest responsibility had yet to be met.  The enemy was still so far distant that he could not be reached till near nightfall, and it was possible that not only would the battle be fought in the dark, but that some at least of the ships would not have daylight to take their positions.  The consequent difficulty and risk was in any event great; but in this case the more so, because the ground was unknown to every officer in the fleet.  The only chart of it in possession of the British was a rude sketch lately taken out of a prize.  There was no time now for calling captains together, nor for forming plans of action.  Then appeared conspicuously the value of that preparedness of mind, as well as of purpose, which at bottom was the greatest of Nelson’s claims to credit.  Much had been received by him from Nature,—­gifts