achievement, and yet more brilliant promise, to justify committing to him the most momentous charge that in this war had devolved on a British admiral.  A letter from one of the puisne lords of the Admiralty was read publicly on board the “Prince George,” flagship of Sir William Parker,—­the same who had the controversy with Nelson about the Battle of St. Vincent,—­denouncing Lord St. Vincent in no very gentle terms for having sent so young a flag-officer.[61] “Sir William Parker and Sir John Orde have written strong remonstrances against your commanding the detached squadron instead of them,” wrote St. Vincent to Nelson.  “I did all I could to prevent it, consistently with my situation, but there is a faction, fraught with all manner of ill-will to you, that, unfortunately for the two Baronets, domined over any argument or influence I could use:  they will both be ordered home the moment their letters arrive.”  It will be seen how much was at stake for Nelson personally in the issue of these weeks.  Happy the man who, like him, has in such a case the clear light of duty to keep his steps from wavering!

The night after Nelson made sail for Alexandria the two hostile bodies crossed the same tract of sea, on divergent courses; but a haze covered the face of the deep, and hid them from each other.  When the day dawned, they were no longer within range of sight; but had the horizon of the British fleet been enlarged by flanking frigates, chasing on either side, the immunity of the French from detection could scarcely have continued.  For some days not a hundred miles intervened between these two foes, proceeding for the same port.  On the 26th, being two hundred and fifty miles from Alexandria, Nelson sent the “Mutine” ahead to communicate with the place and get information; a single vessel being able to outstrip the progress of a body of ships, which is bound to the speed of its slowest member.  On the 28th the squadron itself was off the town, when the admiral to his dismay found that not only the French had not appeared, but that no certain news of their destination was to be had.

Preoccupied as his mind had been with the fear that the enemy had so far the start that their army would be out of the transports before he overtook them, the idea that he might outstrip them does not seem to have entered his head.  Only three vessels had been spoken since Sicily was left behind,—­two from Alexandria and one from the Archipelago; but these knew nothing of the French, being doubtless, when met, ahead of the latter’s advance.  That Nelson again consulted with his captains seems probable—­indeed almost certain, from casual mention; but if so, their opinion as to the future course does not appear.  The unremitting eagerness of his temperament, the singleness of his purpose, which saw the whole situation concentrated in the French fleet, had worked together up to the present to bring him to the true strategic point just ahead of time; although, by no fault of his own, he had started near three weeks late.[62] These two high qualities now conspired to mislead him by their own excess.  “His active and anxious mind,” wrote Captain Berry, “would not permit him to rest a moment in the same place; he therefore shaped his course to the northward, for the coast of Caramania [in Asia Minor], to reach as quickly as possible some quarter where information could probably be obtained.”