develop to them his own ideas of the different and best modes of attack, in all possible positions.”  That such conversations were not confined to tactical questions, but extended to what would now be called the strategy of the situation, is evident from allusions by Saumarez to the various surmises concerning the probable movements of the enemy.  Nelson never yielded a particle of his responsibility, nor of his credit, but it is clear that such discussion would not only broaden his own outlook, but prepare his subordinates to give readier and sounder views upon any new conjuncture that might arise.

He now summoned on board four captains “in whom I place great confidence,” Saumarez, Troubridge,—­the two seniors,—­Ball, and Darby, stated the case, and received their opinions.  These seem to have been given in writing,[60] and from his letter to St. Vincent the results of the conference, as shown by his decision, may be summarized as follows.  With the existing winds, it would be impossible for such a fleet as the enemy’s to get to the westward.  Had they aimed at Sicily, an object concerning which explicit disclaimers had been given by the French to the Neapolitan Government, some indication of their approach must have been known at Syracuse, the day before, when the British were off that city.  Consequently, the expedition must have gone to the eastward.  The size and nature of the armament must also be considered,—­forty thousand troops, a dozen ships-of-the-line, besides a staff of scientific men,—­all pointed to a great, distant, and permanent occupation.  The object might be Corfu, or to overthrow the existing government of Turkey, or to settle a colony in Egypt.  As between these, all equally possible, the last was the most direct and greatest menace to present British interests, and should determine his course.  “If they have concerted a plan with Tippoo Saib, to have vessels at Suez, three weeks, at this season, is a common passage to the Malabar coast, where our India possessions would be in great danger.”

Such was the conclusion—­how momentous at the moment can only be realized by those who will be at the pains to consider a man still young, with reputation brilliant indeed, but not established; intrusted with a great chance, it is true, but also with a great responsibility, upon which rested all his future.  On slight, though decisive, preponderance of evidence, he was about to risk throwing away an advantage a seaman must appreciate, that of being to windward of his enemy,—­able to get at him,—­the strategist’s position of command.  The tongues of envy and censure might well be—­we now know that they were—­busy in inquiring why so young an admiral had so high charge, and in sneering at his failure to find the enemy.  “Knowing my attachment to you,” wrote his old friend, Admiral Goodall, alongside whom he had fought under Hotham, “how often have I been questioned:  ’What is your favourite hero about?  The French fleet has passed under his nose,’ &c.,