for our help to save them—­even this is crime enough with the French.”  Safety—­true safety—­could be had only by strenuous and decisive action in support of Nelson’s squadron.  Did not the attack on Malta indicate a design upon Sicily?  “Were I commanding a fleet attending an army which is to invade Sicily, I should say to the general, ’If you can take Malta, it secures the safety of your fleet, transports, stores, &c., and insures your safe retreat [from Sicily] should that be necessary; for if even a superior fleet of the enemy should arrive, before one week passes, they will be blown to leeward, and you may pass with safety.’  This would be my opinion....  I repeat it, Malta is the direct road to Sicily.”  If the French are overtaken, he continues, and found in some anchorage, it can scarcely be so strong but that I can get at them, but there will be needed things which I have not, fire-ships, bomb-vessels, and gunboats, when one hour would either destroy or drive them out.  Without such aid, the British may be crippled in their attempt, and forced to leave the Mediterranean.  In case of blockade—­or necessity to remain for any reason—­the fleet must have supplies; which only Naples can furnish.  Failing these it must retire, and then Sicily and Naples are lost.  Since, then, so much assistance must be given in time, why postpone now, when one strong blow would give instant safety?  Why should not his own motto, “I will not lose a moment in attacking them,” apply as well to the policy of an endangered kingdom as of a British admiral?

If this reasoning and advice took more account of the exigencies of the British arms than of the difficulties of a weak state of the second order, dependent for action upon the support of other nations, they were at least perfectly consonant to the principles and practice of the writer, wherever he himself had to act.  But Nelson could not expect his own spirit in the King of the Two Sicilies.  Even if the course suggested were the best for Naples under the conditions, it is the property of ordinary men, in times of danger, to see difficulties more clearly than advantages, and to shrink from steps which involve risk, however promising of success.  The Neapolitan Government, though cheered by the appearance of the British fleet, had to consider danger also on the land side, where it relied upon the protection of Austria, instead of trusting manfully to its own arms and the advantages of its position, remote from the centre of French power.  Austria had pledged herself to support Naples, if invaded without just cause; but it was not certain that she would interfere if the cause of attack was the premature admission of British ships into the ports of the kingdom, beyond the number specified in the still recent treaties with France.  The Emperor was meditating war, in which he expected to assist Naples and to be assisted by her; but he did not choose to be hurried, and might refuse aid if an outbreak were precipitated.