Being entirely without intelligence as to the real object of the French, there was nothing to do but to follow upon their track, with eyes open for indications.  They were known to have gone southerly, towards Naples and Sicily; and these two points, parts of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, had been mentioned by Jervis as probable destinations.  The “Orion” and “Alexander” rejoined in two or three days, and on the 14th of June information, second-hand but probable, was obtained that on the 4th the French armament had been seen off the west end of Sicily, steering to the eastward.  “If they pass Sicily,” said Nelson in his letter to Spencer written the next day, “I shall believe they are going on their scheme of possessing Alexandria, and getting troops to India—­a plan concerted with Tippoo Saib, by no means so difficult as might at first view be imagined.”  Troubridge was now sent ahead in the “Mutine” to communicate with Sir William Hamilton, the British minister at Naples, and with Acton, the prime minister of that Kingdom.  He took with him letters from the admiral, who wished to know what co-operation he might hope from the Court of Naples, in the matters of supplies, of frigates to act as lookouts, and of pilots for Sicilian waters.

On the 17th the squadron hove-to ten miles off Naples, and Troubridge rejoined.  The Neapolitan Government sent assurances of good wishes, and of hatred to the French; supplies would be given under the rose, and Acton sent a written order to that effect, addressed to the governors of ports in the name of the King.  Naples being at peace with France, assistance with ships could not be given, nor, to use the words of Nelson, “the smallest information of what was, or was likely to be, the future destination of the French armament.  With this comfortable account I pushed for the Faro of Messina.”  Troubridge brought word, however, that the French fleet was off Malta, about to attack it, which served to give direction for the squadron’s next move.

After leaving Naples Nelson wrote strong and clear letters to Sir William Hamilton upon the existing conditions.  Why should Naples stand in shivering hesitation about taking a decided step in support of Great Britain?  She had looked and prayed for the arrival of the fleet, as the one force competent to check the designs of the French.  Sicily could be approached only by water, and the distance of Naples from Northern Italy rendered the control of the sea most advantageous, if not absolutely essential, to a French army attempting to hold the boot of the peninsula.  Now the British fleet had come, in force adequate to neutralize the French Navy, and, in Nelson’s belief, to defeat and destroy it, if properly supported.  Did Naples expect to escape by a timid adherence to half measures, when by her notorious preference for the British she had already gained the ill-will of the French?  “The French know as well as you and I do, that their Sicilian Majesties called