Vanity was rather a hard name to call the natural elation of a young admiral, intrusted with an unusually important service, and proud of his command; but the providential interposition worked directly to his advantage.  The delays caused by the repairs to the “Vanguard,” and by the subsequent necessity of seeking the separated frigates at the rendezvous appointed for such a case, made possible the junction of Troubridge, of whose approach Nelson was totally ignorant.  On the 2d of June Sir James Saumarez mentions speaking a ship, which a few days before had seen eleven sail-of-the-line, supposed to be English.  “We are at a loss what conjectures to put on this intelligence.”  Five days before this, May 28, a vessel out of Marseilles had informed them of Bonaparte’s sailing with all his transports.  Nelson would doubtless have pursued them at once, in conformity with his instructions to ascertain the enemy’s objects; but for such operations, essentially those of a scouting expedition, the frigates were too necessary to be left behind.  On the 4th of June he reached the rendezvous, and, not finding the frigates, waited.  The next morning, by the arrival of the “Mutine,” he learned that he was to expect the reinforcement, which converted his division into a fleet, and enlarged his mission from one of mere reconnoissance to the duty of overtaking and destroying a great maritime expedition.

Besides this good news, the “Mutine” brought word of another misfortune, more irretrievable than the loss of spars.  She had fallen in with the frigates three days before, and the senior captain had told Hardy that he was going with them to Gibraltar, persuaded that the condition of the flagship, which he had seen, would necessitate her return to an arsenal for repairs.  “I thought Hope would have known me better,” commented Nelson, when he became aware of a step which materially affected, in fact probably entirely changed, the course of events, and most seriously embarrassed all his subsequent movements.  This untimely and precipitate action, and his remark, illustrate conspicuously the differences between men, and exemplify the peculiar energy and unrelaxing forward impulse which eminently fitted Nelson for his present high charge.

The inconvenience and danger arising from the frigates’ departure was instantly felt.  “Nothing,” wrote Saumarez, “can equal our anxiety to fall in with the reinforcement.  Our squadron has been, these two days, detached in all directions, without falling in with them; and there is strong reason to fear they think us returned to Gibraltar”—­from Hope’s reports.  Such were the risks springing from misplaced caution, more ruinous than the most daring venture, and which from beginning to end well-nigh wrecked the great attempt upon which the Admiralty, St. Vincent, and Nelson had staked so much.  In further consequence, the line-of-battle ships became separated by stretching too far apart in their anxious care to find Troubridge, and when he joined the “Vanguard,”