JULY, 1797-APRIL, 1798.  AGE, 39.

Too much success is not wholly desirable; an occasional beating is good for men—­and nations.  When Nelson wrote the words with which the preceding chapter ends, he was on the eve of a sharp reverse, met in attempting an enterprise that had occupied his thoughts for more than three months.  While cruising for the Viceroy of Mexico, before Jervis left Lisbon with the fleet, he had considered the possibility of the enemy’s treasure-ships, warned of their danger, taking refuge in the Canary Islands, which belong to Spain.  Meditating upon the contingency, he had formed a project of seizing them there, and probably had already suggested the matter to Jervis, taking advantage of the freedom permitted him by the latter in advancing opinions.  However that be, immediately before he started to meet the Elba convoy, the commander-in-chief asked for his plan, which he submitted in writing, after talking it over with Troubridge, his intimate friend, upon whose judgment Jervis also greatly relied.  Regarded as a purely naval expedition, Nelson pointed out that it was subject to great uncertainties, because, the land being very high, the wind could not be depended on.  It might blow in from the sea, but if so it would be by daylight, which would deprive the attack of the benefits of a surprise; while at night the land wind was too fitful and unreliable to assure the ships reaching their anchorage before the enemy could discover them, and have time for adequate preparation against assault.

For these reasons, certainty of success would depend upon co-operation by the army, and for that Nelson suggested that the Elba troops, over three thousand strong, already in transports and on their way, would provide a force at once available and sufficient.  Save a naval dash by Blake, more than a century before, Teneriffe had never been seriously attacked.  Probably, therefore, the heights commanding the town of Santa Cruz had not been fortified, and could be easily seized by the detachment designated; besides which, the water supply was exposed to interruption by an outside enemy.  If only General De Burgh could be persuaded, Nelson was sure of success, and offered himself to command the naval contingent.  Failing the consent of De Burgh, whom he and Jervis both thought deficient in moral courage to undertake responsibility, could not the admiral get assistance from O’Hara, the governor of Gibraltar, who would have at his disposal one thousand to fifteen hundred men?  More would be better, but still with that number success would be probable.  “Soldiers,” regretted Nelson characteristically, “have not the same boldness in undertaking a political measure that we have; we look to the benefit of our Country and risk our own fame [not life merely] every day to serve her:  a soldier obeys his orders and no more.”  But he thought O’Hara an exception, and then—­could not the substantial advantages move him?  The public treasure of Spain that might