what will the mines of Mexico and Peru signify, compared with the honour I doubt not we shall gain by fighting an angry Don?  They will have thirty sail of the line, we twenty or twenty-two; but fear we shall have a peace before they are ready to come out.  What a sad thing that will be!” His mind reverts to the troops in Elba, which had been left in a most exposed position, and were now about to withdraw under the protection of some frigates, passing through a thousand miles of hostile sea open to the line-of-battle ships at Toulon.  He is more concerned about them than about his possible prize-money in the rich ships from Vera Cruz and Havana, whose danger from his own squadron was agitating all Spain.  “Respecting myself,” he writes to Jervis, “I wish to stay at sea, and I beg, if line-of-battle ships are left out,[55] either on this side the Gut, or to the eastward of Gibraltar, that I may be the man.  This brings forward a subject which I own is uppermost in my mind,—­that of the safety of our troops, should they embark from Elba.  The French have a number of ships at Toulon.  They may get two, three, or four ready, with a number of frigates, and make a push for our convoy.  I am ready, you know, to go eastward to cover them, even to Porto Ferrajo, or off Toulon, or Minorca, as you may judge proper.”

This exposed detachment continued to occupy his thoughts.  A month later, on the 11th of April, he again writes:  “I own, Sir, my feelings are alive for the safety of our army from Elba.  If the French get out two sail of the line, which I am confident they may do, our troops are lost, and what a triumph that would be to them!  I know you have many difficulties to contend with, but I am anxious that nothing should miscarry under your orders.  If you think a detachment can be spared, I am ready to go and do my best for their protection.”  In both letters he apologizes for this freedom of urgency with his superior:  “I have said much, but you have spoiled me by allowing me to speak and write freely.  I trust you will not imagine that my taking the great liberty of thus mentioning my thoughts, arises from any other motive than affection towards you.”

Jervis had already joined him on the 1st of April, before the second letter was written.  His hesitation about sending the detachment suggested by Nelson had arisen, not from doubt as to the danger of the troops, but from the imminent expectation of the Spanish fleet coming out.  The British force was already too inferior, numerically, to risk any diminution, in view of such a contingency.  Confronted with divergent objects, Jervis would not be drawn into the snare of dividing his force; but after reconnoitring the port, he was satisfied that the Spaniards could not sail before Nelson had time to fulfil the proposed mission, and on the 12th of April he gave him the necessary orders.  The latter transferred his own squadron to the command of Sir James Saumarez, and started at once.  He had now returned to the “Captain,”