expected.  Nelson, justly estimating the importance of Leghorn, and over-sanguine of the support he might hope from the inhabitants, projected a sudden assault upon the town, by troops to be drawn from the garrisons in Corsica, supported by seamen of the squadron.  Speaking of the steady intercourse between, that island and the mainland by way of Leghorn, he says:  “The only way is to cut at the root, for whilst Leghorn is open, this communication must constantly be going on.  This moment brings to my eyes a body of about 200 men, with the Corsican flag carrying before them; they are partly from Nice, and joined by Genoese, &c., on the road.  The time approaches,” he rightly forecasts, “when we shall either have to fight them in Corsica or Leghorn.”  The imminence of the danger was evident.  “Our affairs in Corsica are gloomy,” he had already written to the Duke of Clarence.  “There is a very strong republican party in that island, and they are well supported from France; the first favourable moment, they will certainly act against us.”

The details of the intended assault upon Leghorn do not appear, and it is probable that they never passed beyond the stage of discussion to that of acceptance, although he alludes to the plans as “laid.”  Clear-sighted for the key of a situation, and ardent to strike “at the root,” as five years later in the Baltic he was eager to cut away the Russian root of the Armed Neutrality, instead of hewing off the Danish branch, Nelson urged the speedy adoption of the measure, and pressed his own fitness to harmonize the land and sea forces under one command, in virtue of his rank as Colonel of Marines.  “Leghorn is in such a state,” he writes to Elliot on the 5th of August, “that a respectable force landed, would, I have every reason to suppose, insure the immediate possession of the town.  Not less than a thousand troops should be sent, to which I will add every soldier in my squadron, and a party of seamen to make a show.  In every way, pray consider this as private, and excuse my opinions.  I well know the difficulty of getting a proper person to command this party.  Firmness, and that the people of Leghorn should know the person commanding, will most assuredly have a great effect.  A cordial co-operation with me (for vanity apart, no one is so much feared or respected in Leghorn as myself) is absolutely necessary.  I am going further:  we know the jealousy of the army against the navy, but I am by the King’s commission a Colonel in the army from June 1st, 1795.”  After discussing this difficult question of professional susceptibilities, he concludes:  “You will consider, Sir, all these points, and form a much better judgment than I can, only give me credit that the nearest wish of my heart is to serve my King and my Country, at every personal risk and consideration.  It has ever pleased God to prosper all my undertakings, and I feel confident of His blessing on this occasion.  I ever consider my motto, Fides et Opera."[38]