Nelson’s deeds did not belie his words.  Immediately after definite news of Beaulieu’s retreat to the Po was received, Sir John Jervis appeared off Genoa with the fleet.  The “Agamemnon” joined him, and remained in company until the 23d of April, when by Nelson’s request she sailed on a cruise to the westward.  From that time until the 4th of June she was actively employed between Nice and Genoa, engaging the batteries, and from time to time cutting out vessels from the anchorages.  His attempts were more or less successful; on one occasion he captured a considerable portion of the French siege-train going forward for the siege of Mantua; but upon the whole, the futility of the attempt became apparent.  “Although I will do my utmost, I do not believe it is in my power to prevent troops or stores from passing along shore.  Heavy swells, light breezes, and the near approach to the shore which these vessels go are our obstacles....  You may perceive I am distressed.  Do you really think we are of any use here?  If not, we may serve our country much more by being in other places.  The Levant and coast of Spain call aloud for ships, and they are, I fancy, employed to no purpose here.”  The position was almost hopelessly complicated by the Genoese coasters, which plied their trade close to the beach, between the mother city and the little towns occupied by the French, and which Nelson felt unable to touch.  “There are no vessels of any consequence in any bay from Monaco to Vado,” he wrote to Jervis; “but not less than a hundred Genoese are every day passing, which may or may not have stores for the French.”  “The French have no occasion to send provisions from France.  The coasts are covered with Genoese vessels with corn, wine, hay, &c., for places on the coast; and they know I have no power to stop the trade with the towns.  I saw this day not less than forty-five Genoese vessels, all laden, passing along the coast.  What can I do?”

Although not definitely so stated, it is shown, by an allusion, that Nelson at this time entertained, among other ideas, the project of keeping afloat in transports a body of three thousand troops, which should hover upon the coast, and by frequent descents impose a constant insecurity upon the long line of communications from Nice to Genoa.  The same plan was advocated by him against the Spanish peninsula in later years.[36] Of this conception it may be said that it is sound in principle, but in practice depends largely upon the distance from the centre of the enemy’s power at which its execution is attempted.  Upon the Spanish coast, in 1808, in the hands of Lord Cochrane, it was undoubtedly a most effective secondary operation; but when that distinguished officer proposed to apply a like method, even though on a much greater scale, to the western coast of France, against the high-road south of Bordeaux, it can scarcely be doubted that he would have met a severe disappointment, such as attended similar actions upon the Channel in the Seven Years’ War.  On the Riviera, in 1795, this means might have been decisive; in 1796, in the face of Bonaparte’s fortified coast, it could scarcely have been more than an annoyance.  At all events, the advocacy of it testifies to the acuteness and energy with which Nelson threw himself into the operations especially intrusted to him.