could communication between the army and the British fleet be restored and maintained.  Beaulieu, who had lately acquired a high reputation on the battle-fields of Belgium, had now succeeded De Vins in the command.  He was averse to opening the campaign by an advance to the sea, a feeling shared by the Austrians generally.  He wished rather to await the enemy in the plains of Lombardy, and to follow up by a decisive blow the victory which he confidently expected there.  It was in this connection that Nelson warned him, that he must not reckon upon the French following the line of action which he himself would prefer.

The time for hostilities had now arrived; from February to August being the period that Bonaparte, who knew the wars of Italy historically, considered the most proper for operations in the field, because the least sickly.  But for the backwardness of the spring,—­for snow that year lay upon the mountains late into March,—­the campaign doubtless would have been begun before.  At the same time came fresh reports, probably set afloat by the French, of large reinforcements of seamen for the fleet and transports, in Toulon and Marseilles; and Nelson furthermore received precise information that the enemy’s movement would be in three columns,—­one upon Ceva, which was Bonaparte’s original scheme, one by the Bocchetta, and the third either to march through Genoese territory to Spezia, or to be carried thither by sea.  Nelson felt no doubt that the last was the real plan, aiming at the occupation of Leghorn and entrance into the plains of Italy.  The others he considered to be feints.  There will in this opinion be recognized the persistency of his old ideas.  In fact, he a month later revived his proposal of the previous year, to occupy San Remo,—­this time with British troops.

The urgency of the British, aided, perhaps, by the reports of the French designs, prevailed at last upon Beaulieu to advance as requested; nor can it be denied that the taking of Vado was in itself a most proper and desirable accessory object of the campaign.  Unfortunately, the Austrian general, as is well known, fastening his eyes too exclusively upon the ulterior object of his movement, neglected to provide for the immediate close combination and mutual support of the organized forces,—­his own and the Piedmontese,—­upon which final success would turn.  Manoeuvring chiefly by his own left, towards the Riviera, and drawing in that direction the efforts of the centre and right, he weakened the allied line at the point where the Austrian right touched the Sardinian left.  Through this thin curtain Bonaparte broke, dividing the one from the other, and, after a series of combats which extended over several days, rendering final that division, both political and military, for the remainder of the war.