The object of his present mission was to ascertain what preparations for the expected descent were being made along the Riviera, and to frustrate them as far as lay in the power of his squadron.  He soon reported to Jervis that there was as yet no collection of vessels between Nice and Genoa.  He then went on to reconnoitre Toulon, where he saw thirteen sail-of-the-line and five frigates lying in the outer roads, ready for sea, while five more of the line he learned were fitting at the arsenal.  During the six days he remained off the port he noted that continual progress was being made in the enemy’s preparations.  At the end of this time, on the 23d of February, 1796, the admiral joined with the fleet, and the same afternoon the “Agamemnon” again parted company for Genoa, where she anchored on the 2d of March.

The bustle on board the French ships confirmed Nelson’s belief in the descent upon Tuscany; and it is interesting here to quote his words upon the possibilities of the operation, regarded from the naval point of view by one of the ablest of sea-generals.  His opinion throws light upon the vexed question of the chances for and against Napoleon’s projected invasion of England in 1805,—­so far, that is, as the purely naval part of the latter project is concerned.  He imagines as perfectly feasible ("I firmly believe,” are his words) a combination at Toulon, of the fleet already there with divisions arriving from Cadiz and Brest, giving a total much superior to that actually with Jervis.  This anticipates Napoleon’s projected concentration under Villeneuve in the Channel.  Nelson then continues:  “One week’s very superior fleet will effect a landing between Port Especia and Leghorn, I mean on that coast of Italy....  We may fight their fleet, but unless we can destroy them [i.e. the transports], their transports will push on and effect their landing.  What will the French care for the loss of a few men-of-war?  It is nothing if they can get into Italy.”  “Make us masters of the channel for three days, and we are masters of the world,” wrote Napoleon to his admirals, with preparations far more complete than those Nelson was considering in 1796, and the distance across the Channel is less than from Vado to Spezia.[35]

With these convictions, Nelson immediately began to urge the necessity of again occupying Vado upon the Austrian commander-in-chief, through the medium of the British ministers to Genoa and Turin, with whom he was in frequent correspondence.  If this were not done, he assured them, the enemy’s fleet could with ease convoy a body of troops in transports to Italy, which they could not do with their present force unless they held Vado.  It was also the only means, he added, by which the French could be prevented from receiving plenty of provisions from Genoa.  “Unless the Austrians get possession of a point of land, we cannot stop the coasting-trade.”  The latter argument, at any rate, was incontestable; and it was also true that only by an advance to Vado