part he said:  “Our admirals will have, I believe, much to answer for in not giving me that force which I so repeatedly called for, and for at last leaving me with Agamemnon alone.  Admiral Hotham kept my squadron too small for its duty; and the moment Sir Hyde took the command of the fleet he reduced it to nothing,—­only one frigate and a brig; whereas I demanded two seventy-four-gun ships and eight or ten frigates and sloops to insure safety to the army.”

It is unnecessary to inquire into the motives of the two admirals for the distribution of their force.  Unquestionably, the first thing for them to do was to destroy or neutralize the French fleet; and next to destroy, or at least impede, the communications of the French army.  That it was possible to do this almost wholly may be rested upon the authority of Nelson, whose matured opinion, given five years later, has already been quoted.  Two opportunities to cripple the Toulon fleet were lost; but even so, after the junction of Man, in June, the superiority over it was so great that much might have been spared to the Riviera squadron.  The coast was not at this time so extensively fortified that coasting could not, in Nelson’s active hands, have been made a very insufficient means of supply.  As an illustration of the operations then possible, on the 26th of August, six weeks after the naval battle of July 13, the “Agamemnon,” with her little squadron, anchored in the Bay of Alassio, three cables’ length from the fort in the centre of the town, and with her boats took possession of all the French vessels in the harbor.  Two months later, so much had the place been strengthened, he could not vouch for success with less than three ships-of-the-line; but had the pressure been consistently applied during those months, the French position would long before have become untenable.  That a shore line, by great and systematic effort, could be rendered secure throughout for coasters, was proved by Napoleon’s measures to cover the concentration of the Boulogne flotilla in 1803-5; but such conditions did not obtain between Nice and Vado in 1795.

Despite the abortive and ignominious ending to the campaign, Nelson’s own reputation issued from it not only unscathed, but heightened; and this is saying much, for, although due public recognition of his services had scarcely been extended,—­except in conferring the Marines upon him,—­he had already, before its beginning, made upon all who were brought into contact with him that impression of unusual efficiency, zeal, and sound judgment, to which subsequent employment and opportunity apply a sure and searching test.  As he entered upon his detached duties, the Viceroy of Corsica, who had necessarily seen and known much of his past conduct, wrote to him thus:  “Give me leave, my dear Sir, to congratulate you on the Agamemnon’s supporting uniformly, on all occasions, the same reputation which has always distinguished that ship since I have been