When the attack at Voltri was made, the “Agamemnon” was lying in Vado Bay.  Leaving a frigate there, Nelson started immediately for Genoa, in order, by the presence of a superior naval force and the fear of retaliation, both to compel the Republic to have its neutrality observed, and to check similar undertakings in the future.  The “Agamemnon” was laid across the harbor’s mouth, and no French vessel was allowed to sail.  Urgent representations were made to Nelson by the Austrian minister and commander-in-chief, that, if the ship were withdrawn, the consequences to the army would be most serious.  Contrary, therefore, to his personal inclinations, which were always to be at the front, he remained, although the demonstrations of the gunboats continued, and it was evident that they would at least annoy the Austrian flank in case of an assault.  The latter evil, however, was much less disquieting than a descent on the army’s line of retreat, at the same moment that it was assailed in front in force; and it was evident that the Austrian general was feeling an uneasiness, the full extent of which he did not betray.  De Vins had by this time quitted his command, ill, and had been succeeded by General Wallis.

In this condition of affairs, a general attack upon the Austrian positions was made by the French on the morning of November 24.  As had been feared, the gunboats took part, in the absence of any British ships,—­the frigate having been removed, Nelson asserts, without his knowledge; but the matter was of very secondary importance, for the weight of the enemy’s attack fell upon the positions in the mountains, the centre and right, which were routed and driven back.  Swinging round to their own right, towards the sea, the victorious French pushed after the disordered enemy, seeking to intercept their retreat by the coast.  Had there then been established, in a well-chosen point of that narrow road, a resolute body of men, even though small, they might well have delayed the fliers until the main body of the pursuers came up; but the presence of the “Agamemnon” controlled the departure of the intended expedition from Genoa, upon which alone, as an organized effort, the projected obstruction depended.  Thus she was the efficient cause, as Nelson claimed, that many thousands of Austrians escaped capture.  As it was, they lost in this affair, known as the Battle of Loano, seven thousand men, killed, wounded, or prisoners.  The entire Riviera was abandoned, and they retreated across the Apennines into Piedmont.

When things go wrong, there is always a disposition on the part of each one concerned to shift the blame.  The Austrians had complained before the action, and still more afterwards, of the failure of the fleet to aid them.  Nelson thought their complaint well founded.  “They say, and true, they were brought on the coast at the express desire of the English, to co-operate with the fleet, which fleet nor admiral they never saw.”  On his own