He even feared for Genoa itself, and for the “Agamemnon,” while she lay there, as the result of such a dash.  The recurrence of this prepossession is illustrative of his view of possibilities.  The true and primary object of the French was to consolidate their communications; nor, with Bonaparte in the influential position he then occupied, was any such ex-centric movement likely.  For useful purposes, Genoa was already at his disposal; the French subsistence department was, by his plans, to collect there rations of corn for sixty thousand men for three months, preparatory to an advance.  For the same object the coasting activity redoubled along the Riviera, from Toulon to the French front.  By November 1st a hundred sail—­transports and small ships of war—­had assembled fifteen miles behind Borghetto, in Alassio Bay, whither Nelson had chased them.  Depots and supplies were collecting there for the prospective movement.  Nelson offered to enter the bay with three ships-of-the-line, specified by name, and to destroy them; but this was declined by Sir Hyde Parker, who had temporarily succeeded Hotham in command, and who at a later day, in the Baltic, was to check some of Nelson’s finest inspirations.  “I pretend not to say,” wrote the latter, a month afterwards, when the Austrians had been driven from their lines, “that the Austrians would not have been beat had not the gunboats harassed them, for, on my conscience, I believe they would; but I believe the French would not have attacked had we destroyed all the vessels of war, transports, etc.”  As to the practicability of destroying them, Nelson’s judgment can safely be accepted, subject only to the chances which are inseparable from war.

So far from reinforcing the squadron on the Riviera, Sir Hyde Parker first reduced it, and then took away the frigates at this critical moment, when the indications of the French moving were becoming apparent in an increase of boldness.  Their gunboats, no longer confining themselves to the convoy of coasters, crept forward at times to molest the Austrians, where they rested on the sea.  Nelson had no similar force to oppose to them, except the Neapolitans, whom he ordered to act, but with what result is not clear.  At the same time the French partisans in Genoa became very threatening.  On the 10th of November a party of three hundred, drawn from the ships in the port, landed at Voltri, about nine miles from Genoa, seized a magazine of corn, and an Austrian commissary with L10,000 in his charge.  The place was quickly retaken, but the effrontery of the attempt from a neutral port showed the insecurity of the conditions.  At the same time a rumor spread that a force of between one and two thousand men, partly carried from Genoa in the French ships of war then lying there, partly stealing along shore in coasters from Borghetto, was to seize a post near Voltri, and hold it.  Nelson was informed that men were absolutely being recruited on the Exchange of Genoa for this expedition.