Nelson’s confidence in himself and in his profession, and his accurate instinct that war cannot be made without running risks, combined with his lack of experience in the difficulties of land operations to mislead his judgment in the particular instance.  In a converse sense, there may be applied to him the remark of the French naval critic, that Napoleon lacked “le sentiment exact des difficultes de la marine.”  It was not only to British seamen, and to the assured control of the sea, that Nelson thought such an attempt offered reasonable prospect of success.  He feared a like thing might be effected by the French,—­by evasion.  “If the enemy’s squadron comes on this coast, and lands from three to four thousand men between Genoa and Savona, I am confident that either the whole Austrian army will be defeated, or must inevitably retreat into Piedmont, and abandon their artillery and stores.”  These words, the substance of which he frequently repeats, though written immediately before the disastrous Battle of Loano, do not apply to the purpose entertained by the French on that occasion, of endeavoring, by a small detachment at Voltri, to check the Austrian retreat till their pursuers came up.  He is contemplating a much more considerable and sustained effort, strategic in character, and identical in aim with his own proposal to De Vins about San Remo.  It is clear that Nelson, in his day, did not attach absolute deterrent effect to a fleet in being, even to such an one as the British then had in the Mediterranean.  Important a factor as it was, it might conceivably be disregarded, by a leader who recognized that the end in view justified the risk.

There was yet another motive actuating Nelson in his present proposals.  Justly impatient of the delays and colorless policy of both De Vins and the British leaders, he foresaw that the latter would be made to take the blame, if the campaign proved abortive or disastrous.  The Austrians had at least something to show.  They had advanced, and they had seized Vado Bay, cutting off the intercourse between Genoa and France, which Bonaparte deemed so important, and at the same time securing an anchorage for the fleet.  The latter had done nothing, although its co-operation had been promised; except Nelson’s little squadron, in which was but one small ship-of-the-line out of the twenty-three under Hotham’s command, it had not been seen.[33] Nelson was determined, as far as in him lay, to remove all grounds for reproach.  He urged the admiral to send him more ships, and abounded in willingness towards De Vins.  For the latter he had at first felt the esteem and confidence which he almost invariably showed, even to the point of weakness, towards those associated with him; but he now became distrustful, and devoted himself to stopping every loophole of excuse which might afterwards be converted into reproaches to the navy.