Nelson’s active mind, clinging with its usual accurate insight to the decisive factor in the situation, now fixed upon the idea of seizing a suitable point upon the Riviera to the westward of the French, upon their line of communication with Nice.  A body of troops there, strong enough to hold the position, would stop the passage of supplies by land, and, if they controlled an anchorage, a condition indispensable to their support,—­and to their retreat, if necessary to retire,—­the small vessels based upon that could better interrupt the coasting business.  In pursuance of this plan, he in the first week of September made a cruise with the “Agamemnon” as far to the westward as Nice, reconnoitring carefully all recesses of the shore line that seemed available for the purpose.  Upon his return, he wrote to De Vins what he had done, and described San Remo as the only available spot.  He mentioned its disadvantages as well as its advantages, but undertook positively to land there five thousand men with field-guns, and provisions for a few days, to maintain their supplies by sea, and to cover their embarkation in case retreat became imperative.  In short, he guaranteed to land such a force safely, and to be responsible for its communications; for both which he practically pledged his professional reputation.  He added, what was indisputable, that the French army must abandon its present lines for want of supplies, if San Remo were held for some time.

De Vins replied on the 14th of September, expressing his interest in the matter thus broached to him, but carefully evading the issue.  He addressed his remarks to the comparative merits of Vado and San Remo as anchorages, upon which Nelson had touched barely, and only incidentally, for the gist of his proposal was simply to intercept the enemy’s communications; if this were feasible, all other considerations were subsidiary and matters of detail.  San Remo was admitted to be the poorer anchorage, unfit for the fleet, but open to small vessels, which could carry the supplies to the Austrian detachment, and stop those of the enemy.  The move proposed was intended to effect by sea, substantially, the object which De Vins himself had told Nelson, three weeks before, that he was trying to secure through the co-operation of the Sardinian land forces.  “He has been long expecting,” wrote Nelson on the 13th of August, “an attack by General Colli with the Piedmontese near Ormea, directly back from Vintimiglia.  This is the great point to be carried, as the Piedmontese army would then get Vintimiglia, and ... probably, unless the enemy are very active, their retreat to Nice will be cut off.  De Vins says he has flattered and abused the Piedmontese and Neapolitans, but nothing will induce them to act.”  Colli was a good soldier, but his relations with the Austrian were very strained, and coalitions rarely act cordially.  This plan, however, becoming known to the French, was commended by Bonaparte as well conceived.  “We