The case bore some resemblance to that in which he had disobeyed Hughes in the West Indies; but the disregard of the superior’s orders on the earlier occasion was more direct, and the necessity for it less urgent.  In both he disobeyed first, and referred afterwards, and in both his action was practically sustained; for, whatever the technical fault, the course taken was the one demanded by the needs of the situation.  It is possible to recognize the sound policy, the moral courage, and the correctness of such a step in the particular instance, without at all sanctioning the idea that an officer may be justified in violating orders, because he thinks it right.  The justification rests not upon what he thinks, but upon the attendant circumstances which prove that he is right; and, if he is mistaken, if the conditions have not warranted the infraction of the fundamental principle of military efficiency,—­obedience,—­he must take the full consequences of his error, however honest he may have been.  Nor can the justification of disobedience fairly rest upon any happy consequences that follow upon it, though it is a commonplace to say that the result is very apt to determine the question of reward or blame.  There is a certain confusion of thought prevalent on this matter, most holding the rule of obedience too absolutely, others tending to the disorganizing view that the integrity of the intention is sufficient; the practical result, and for the average man the better result, being to shun the grave responsibility of departing from the letter of the order.  But all this only shows more clearly the great professional courage and professional sagacity of Nelson, that he so often assumed such a responsibility, and so generally—­with, perhaps, but a single exception—­was demonstrably correct in his action.

Hotham in this case very heartily approved what had been done, and issued, to the fleet in general, orders similar to those given by Nelson; but he did not like the difficulties that surrounded the question of co-operation, and left the conduct of affairs on the spot wholly to his eager and enterprising subordinate.  The latter directed the seizure of all vessels laden with corn for France or the French armies, an order that was construed to apply to the Genoese towns occupied by them.  The cargoes appear to have been sold and the money held.  The cruisers in his command were stationed along the Riviera, east and west of Genoa itself.  Those to the eastward, in the neighborhood of Spezia, where no French were, gave great offence to the Government of the Republic, which claimed that their chief city was blockaded; but Nelson refused to remove them.  They are not blockading Genoa, he said, but simply occupying the station best suited to intercept a contraband trade.  The various British vessels displayed the full activity that might have been expected from the character of their leader, and the pressure was speedily felt by the enemy, and