month, every moment in expectation of reinforcements from England.  Great good fortune has hitherto saved us, what none in this fleet could have expected for so long a time.  Near two months we have been skulking from them.  Had they not got so much cut up on the 14th of March, Corsica, Rome, and Naples would, at this moment, have been in their possession, and may yet, if these people [the Admiralty] do not make haste to help us.  I am out of spirits, although never better in health.”

His depression was due less to the inadequacy of the British fleet than to the dismissal of Lord Hood from the command, news of which was at this time received.  When about to sail from England, to resume his duty as commander-in-chief, he got into a controversy with the Government about the force necessary in the Mediterranean, and, giving offence by the sharpness of his language, was ordered to haul down his flag.  He never again went to sea.  Nelson deplored his loss in terms unusually vivacious:  “Oh, miserable Board of Admiralty!  They have forced the first officer in our service away from his command.”  In more temperate but well-weighed words, he said:  “This fleet must regret the loss of Lord Hood, the best officer, take him altogether, that England has to boast of.  Lord Howe is certainly a great officer in the management of a fleet, but that is all.  Lord Hood is equally great in all situations which an admiral can be placed in.”  In the judgment of the present writer, this estimate of Hood is as accurate as it is moderate in expression.  It was nothing less than providential for the French that he was not in command on the 14th of March, or in the yet more trivial and discreditable affair of July 13th, when, to use again Nelson’s words, “To say how much we wanted Lord Hood at that time, is to say, will you have all the French fleet or no action?”

On the 14th of June the expected reinforcement from England, nine ships-of-the-line, joined the fleet off Minorca; and a few days later a large convoy also arrived, with which the whole body of ships of war put into San Fiorenzo Bay on the 29th.  This concluded for Nelson a period of three months, counting from the action of March 14th, of pretty monotonous cruising with the fleet, the last in which he was to take part until his admiral’s flag was hoisted, two years later.  Though unmarked by any event of importance, the time was passed not unprofitably to himself, for his correspondence bears marks of fruitful reflection, not merely upon the evident inadequacy of his commander-in-chief to the position he unwillingly occupied, but upon the character of the operations and the line of conduct that ought to be followed.  If he does criticise the former’s want of head for enterprise, he formulates for himself a general principle which showed its vital influence in his future career.  “After all my complaints, I have no doubt but, if we can get close to the enemy, we shall defeat any plan of theirs; but we ought to have our ideas beyond mere defensive measures.”