Nelson here evidently assumes that it was possible to have got at the French fleet.  After a man’s reputation has been established, there is always the danger of giving undue weight to his opinions, expressed at an earlier time, somewhat casually, and not under the sobering sense of responsibility.  Hotham may have questioned the possibility of getting at the French effectively, having regard to the fickle lightness of the wind then prevalent, and to the fact that, besides the two ships partially dismasted and for the moment useless, two others, the “Captain” and the “Bedford,” had suffered severely in sails and rigging.  He would also doubtless consider that the three-decked ships, of which he had four, were notoriously bad sailers, and sure to drop behind if the chase lasted long, leaving to eight ships, including the “Neapolitan,” the burden of arresting the enemy, who had shown very fair offensive powers in the morning.  Nelson was not blind to these facts, and not infrequently alludes to them.  “Had we only a breeze, I have no doubt we should have given a destructive blow to the enemy’s fleet.”  “Sure I am, that had the breeze continued, so as to have allowed us to close with the enemy, we should have destroyed their whole fleet.”  Whether these remarks apply to the heat of the engagement, or to the proposed chase, which Hotham declined to permit, is not perfectly clear; but inasmuch as the second part of the action of the 14th consisted, actually, in the French filing by the “Courageux” and the “Illustrious,” upon whom their fire was thus concentrated, while the rest of the British were becalmed out of gunshot, it is very possible he was thinking of that incident only, which doubtless would have taken a very different turn had the main body been able to come down.  His wish to pursue is unquestionable, both from his assertion and from the whole character of his career before and after; and a casual remark, written ten days after the affair, shows his opinion confirmed by time.  “Had our good admiral followed the blow, we should probably have done more, but the risk was thought too great.”

The question attracts attention, both impersonally, as of military interest, and also as bearing upon Nelson’s correctness of judgment, and professional characteristics, at this time.  As regards the amount of wind, it is sufficient to say that the French fleet, having borne away to the westward in the afternoon, was next day out of sight.[28] Most of the British might equally have been out of sight from the position in which they remained.  As for the risk—­of course there was risk; but the whole idea of a general chase rests upon the fact that, for one reason or another, the extreme speed of the ships in each fleet will vary, and that it is always probable that the fastest of the pursuers can overtake the slowest of the pursued.  The resulting combats compel the latter either to abandon his ships, or to incur a general action, which, from the fact of his flight,