The next morning the wind was still southwest and squally.  Hotham at daylight ordered a general chase, which allowed each ship a certain freedom of movement in endeavoring to close with the French.  The “Agamemnon” had been well to the westward, from the start; and being a very handy, quick-working ship, as well as, originally at least, more than commonly fast, was early in the day in a position where she had a fair chance for reaching the enemy.  A favorable opportunity soon occurred, one of those which so often show that, if a man only puts himself in the way of good luck, good luck is apt to offer.  At 8 A.M. the eighty-gun ship “Ca Ira,” third from the rear in the French order, ran on board the vessel next ahead of her, and by the collision lost her fore and main topmasts.  These falling overboard on the lee side—­in this case the port,[27]—­not only deprived her of by far the greater part of her motive power, but acted as a drag on her progress, besides for the time preventing the working of the guns on that side.  The “Ca Ira” dropped astern of her fleet.  Although this eighty-gun ship was much bigger than his own,—­“absolutely large enough to take Agamemnon in her hold,” Nelson said,—­the latter saw his chance, and instantly seized it with the promptitude characteristic of all his actions.  The “Agamemnon,” if she was not already on the port tack, opposite to that on which the fleets had been during the night, must have gone about at this time, and probably for this reason.  She was able thus to fetch into the wake of the crippled vessel, which a frigate had already gallantly attacked, taking advantage of the uselessness of the Frenchman’s lee batteries, encumbered with the wreckage of the masts.

At 10 A.M., the “Ca Ira” and the “Agamemnon” having passed on opposite tacks, the latter again went about and stood in pursuit under all sail, rapidly nearing the enemy, who at this time was taken in tow by a frigate.  But although in this position the French ship could not train her broadside guns upon her smaller opponent, she could still work freely the half-dozen stern guns, and did so with much effect.  “So true did she fire,” noted Nelson, “that not a shot missed some part of the ship, and latterly the masts were struck every shot, which obliged me to open our fire a few minutes sooner than I intended, for it was my intention to have touched his stern before a shot was fired.”  At quarter before eleven, the “Agamemnon” was within a hundred yards of the “Ca Ira’s” stern, and this distance she was able to keep until I P.M.  Here, by the use of the helm and of the sails, the ship alternately turned her starboard side to the enemy to fire her batteries, and again resumed her course, to regain the distance necessarily lost at each deviation.  This raking fire not only killed and wounded many of the “Ca Ira’s” crew, and injured the hull, but, what was tactically of yet greater importance, preventing the replacing of the lost spars.  Thus was entailed upon the French that night a crippled ship, which they could not in honor abandon, nor yet could save without fighting for her,—­a tactical dilemma which was the direct cause of the next day’s battle.