Take then our beginning where we will, there must have existed in that “originally” either Something, or Nothing.  It is a clear matter to prove, a posteriori, that Something did exist; because something exists now:  every matter and every derived spirit must have had a Father; ex nihilo nihil fit, is not more a truth, than that creation must have had a Creator.  However, leaving this plain path (which I only point at by the way for obvious mental uses), let us now try to get at the great antecedent probability that in the beginning Something should have been, rather than Nothing.

The term, Nothing, is a fallacious one:  it does not denote an existence, as Something does, but the end of an existence.  It is in fact a negation, which must presuppose a matter once in being and possible to be denied; it is an abstraction, which cannot happen unless there be somewhat to be taken away; the idea of vacuity must be posterior to that of fullness; the idea of no tree is incompetent to be conceived without the previous idea of a tree; the idea of nonentity suggests, ex vi termini, a pre-existent entity; the idea of Nothing, of necessity, presupposes Something.  And a Something once having been, it would still and for ever continue to be, unless sufficient cause be found for its removal; that cause itself, you will observe, being a Something.  The chances are forcibly in favour of continuance, that is of perpetuity; and the likelihoods proclaim loudly that there should be an Existence.  It was thus, then, antecedently more probable, than in any imaginable beginning from which reason can start, Something should be found existent, rather than Nothing.  This is the first probability.

Next; of what nature and extent is this Something, this Being, likely to be?—­There will be either one such being, or many:  if many, the many either sprang from the one, or the mass are all self-existent; in the former case, there would be a creation and a God:  in the latter, there would be many Gods.  Is the latter antecedently more probable?—­let us see.  First, it is evident that if many are probable, few are more probable, and one most probable of all.  The more possible gods you take away, the more do impediments diminish; until, that is to say, you arrive at that One Being, whom we have already proved probable.  Moreover, many must be absolutely united as one; in which case the many is a gratuitous difficulty, because they may as well be regarded for all purposes of worship or argument as one God:  or the many must have been in essence more or less disunited; in which case, as a state of any thing short of pure concord carries in itself the seeds of dissolution, needs must that one or other of the many (long before any possible beginnings, as we count beginnings, looking down the past vista of eternity), would have taken opportunity by such disturbing causes to become absolute monarch:  whether by peaceful persuasion, or hostile compulsion, or other mode of