of moral principles, but had also retained their convictions of unity with the Divine nature, implied alike in that eternity of morality and in that supremacy of the rational faculties,—­together with a corresponding belief that there may be intimate communion between the spirit of man and his Maker, and that ’they who make reason the light of heaven and the very oracle of God, must consider that the oracle of God is not to be heard but in His holy temple,’ that is to say, in the heart of a good man purged by that indwelling Spirit.[223] Considering the immense influence which Tillotson’s Cambridge teachers had upon the development of his mind, it is curious how widely he differs from them in inward tone.  It is quite impossible to conceive of their dwelling, as he and his followers did, upon the pre-eminent importance of the external evidences.

Tillotson could not adopt as unreservedly as he did his pervading tenet of the reasonableness of Christianity without yielding to reason all the rights due to an unquestioned leader.  Like Henry More, he would have wished to take for a motto ’that generous resolution of Marcus Cicero,—­rationem, quo ea me cunque ducet, sequar.’[224] ‘Doctrines,’ he said, ’are vehemently to be suspected which decline trial.  To deny liberty of inquiry and judgment in matters of religion, is the greatest injury and disparagement to truth that can be, and a tacit acknowledgment that she lies under some disadvantage, and that there is less to be said for her than for error.’[225] ’Tis only things false and adulterate which shun the light and fear the touchstone.’  He has left a beautiful prayer which his editor believed he was in the habit of using before he composed a sermon.  In it he asks to be made impartial in his inquiry after truth, ready always to receive it in love, to practise it in his life, and to continue steadfast in it to the end.  He adds, ’I perfectly resign myself, O Lord, to Thy counsel and direction, in confidence that Thy goodness is such, that Thou wilt not suffer those who sincerely desire to know the truth and rely upon Thy guidance, finally to miscarry.’[226]

These last words are a key to Tillotson’s opinion upon a question about which, in the earlier part of the eighteenth century, there was much animated controversy—­in what light sincere error should be regarded.  If free inquiry on religious subjects is allowable and right, is a man to be held blameless if he arrives at false conclusions in respect of the fundamental articles of faith?  That the answer to be given might involve grave issues continually appeared in discussion alike with Roman Catholics and with Deists.  The former had no stronger argument against liberty of private judgment than to ask how those who freely granted it could pass any moral censure upon the heresies which might constantly result from it.  The latter insisted that, whether they were right or wrong, no Protestant had any title to hold them in the slightest