his remaining in office to have been the effect of strong solicitations after he returned here; declaring that he had never mentioned his purpose of going out but to the Heads of departments and Mr. Madison; he expressed the extreme wretchedness of his existence while in office, and went lengthily into the late attacks on him for levees, &c. and explained to me how he had been led into them by the persons he consulted at New York; and that if he could but know what the sense of the public was, he would most cheerfully conform to it.

February the 16th, 1793.  E. Randolph tells J. Madison and myself, a curious fact which he had from Lear.  When the President went to New York, he resisted for three weeks the efforts to introduce levees.  At length he yielded, and left it to Humphreys and some others to settle the forms.  Accordingly, an antechamber and presence-room were provided, and when those who were to pay their court were assembled, the President set out, preceded by Humphreys.  After passing through the antechamber, the door of the inner room was thrown open, and Humphreys entered first, calling out with a loud voice, ‘The President of the United States.’  The President was so much disconcerted with it, that he did not recover it the whole time of the levee, and when the company was gone, he said to Humphreys, ’Well, you have taken me in once, but, by God, you shall never take me in a second time.’

There is reason to believe that the rejection of the late additional Assumption by the Senate was effected by the President through Lear, operating on Langdon.  Beckley knows this.

February the 26th, 1793.  Notes on the proceedings of yesterday. [See the formal opinions given to the President in writing, and signed.]

First question.  We were all of opinion that the treaty should proceed merely to gratify the public opinion, and not from an expectation of success.  I expressed myself strongly, that the event was so unpromising, that I thought the preparations for a campaign should go on without the least relaxation, and that a day should be fixed with the commissioners for the treaty, beyond which they should not permit the treaty to be protracted, by which day, orders should be given for our forces to enter into action.  The President took up the thing instantly, after I had said this, and declared he was so much in the opinion that the treaty would end in nothing, that he then, in the presence of us all, gave orders to General Knox, not to slacken the preparations for the campaign in the least, but to exert every nerve in preparing for it.  Knox said something about the ultimate day for continuing the negotiations.  I acknowledged myself not a judge on what day the campaign should begin, but that whatever it was, that day should terminate the treaty.  Knox said he thought a winter campaign was always the most efficacious against the Indians.  I was of opinion, since Great Britain insisted on furnishing provisions, that we should offer to repay.  Hamilton thought we should not.