Hamilton declared himself the advocate for peace.
War would derange our affairs greatly; throw us back
many years in the march towards prosperity; be difficult
for us to pursue, our countrymen not being disposed
to become soldiers; a part of the Union feeling no
interest in the war, would with difficulty be brought
to exert itself; and we had no navy. He was for
every thing which would procrastinate the event.
A year, even, was a great gain to a nation strengthening
as we were. It laid open to us, too, the chapter
of accidents, which in the present state of Europe,
was a very pregnant one. That while, however,
he was for delaying the event of war, he had no doubt
it was to take place between us for the object in question:
that jealousy and perseverance were remarkable features
in the character of the Spanish government, with respect
to their American possessions; that so far from receding
as to their claims against us, they had been strengthening
themselves in them. He had no doubt the present
communication was by authority from the court.
Under this impression he thought we should be looking
forward to the day of rupture, and preparing for it.
That if we were unequal to the contest ourselves, it
behoved us to provide allies for our aid. That
in this view, but two nations could be named, France
and England. France was too intimately connected
with Spain in other points, and of too great mutual
value, ever to separate for us. Her affairs too,
were such, that whatever issue they had, she could
not be in a situation to make a respectable mediation
for us. England alone, then, remained. It
would not be easy to effect it with her; however,
he was for trying it, and for sounding them on the
proposition of a defensive treaty of alliance.
The inducements to such a treaty, on their part, might
be, 1. The desire of breaking up our former connections,
which we knew they had long wished. 2. A continuance
of the statu quo in commerce for ten years, which he
believed would be desirable to them. 3. An admission
to some navigable part of the Mississippi, by some
line drawn from the Lake of the Woods to such navigable
part. He had not, he said, examined the map to
see how such a line might be run, so as not to make
too great a sacrifice. The navigation of the
Mississippi being a joint possession, we might then
take measures in concert for the joint security of
it. He was, therefore, for immediately sounding
them on this subject through our minister at London;
yet so as to keep ourselves unengaged as long as possible,
in hopes a favorable issue with Spain might be otherwise
effected. But he was for sounding immediately,
and for not letting slip an opportunity of securing
our object.
E. Randolph concurred, in general, with me. He objected that such a reliance could not be effected without pecuniary consideration probably, which he could not give. And what was to be their aid? If men, our citizens would see their armies get foothold in the United States, with great jealousy; it would be difficult to protect them. Even the French, during the distresses of the late war, excited some jealous sentiments,