first with Ternant, merely that he might have a pretext to engage us on the same ground with Hammond, taking care, at the same time, by an extravagant tariff, to render it impossible we should come to any conclusion with Ternant:  probably meaning, at the same time, to propose terms so favorable to Great Britain, as would attach us to that country by treaty.  On one of those occasions he asserted, that our commerce with Great Britain and her colonies was put on a much more favorable footing than with France and her colonies.  I therefore prepared the tabular comparative view of the footing-of our commerce with those nations, which see among my papers.  See also my project of a treaty and Hamilton’s tariff.  Committed to writing March the 11th, 1792.

It was observable, that whenever, at any of our consultations, any thing was proposed as to Great Britain, Hamilton had constantly ready something which Mr. Hammond had communicated to him, which suited the subject and proved the intimacy of their communications; insomuch, that I believe he communicated to Hammond all our views, and knew from him, in return, the views of the British court.  Many evidences of this occurred; I will state some.  I delivered to the President my report of instructions for Carmichael and Short, on the subject of navigation, boundary, and commerce, and desired him to submit it to Hamilton.  Hamilton made several just criticisms on different parts of it.  But where I asserted that the United States had no right to alienate an inch of the territory of any State, he attacked and denied the doctrine.  See my report, his note, and my answer.  A few days after came to hand Kirkland’s letter, informing us that the British, at Niagara, expected to run a new line between themselves and us; and the reports of Pond and Stedman, informing us it was understood at Niagara, that Captain Stevenson had been sent here by Simcoe to settle that plan with Hammond.  Hence Hamilton’s attack of the principle I had laid down, in order to prepare the way for this new line.  See minute of March the 9th.  Another proof.  At one of our consultations, about the last of December, I mentioned that I wished to give in my report on commerce, in which I could not avoid recommending a commercial retaliation against Great Britain.  Hamilton opposed it violently:  and among other arguments, observed, that it was of more importance to us to have the posts than to commence a commercial war; that this, and this alone, would free us from the expense of the Indian wars; that it would therefore be the height of imprudence in us, while treating for the surrender of the posts, to engage in any thing which would irritate them; that if we did so, they would naturally say, ’These people mean war; let us therefore hold what we have in our hands.’  This argument, struck me forcibly, and I said, ’If there is a hope of obtaining the posts, I agree it would be imprudent to risk that hope by a commercial retaliation.  I will, therefore, wait till Mr.