This practice of Judge Marshall, of travelling out of his case to prescribe what the law would be in a moot case not before the court, is very irregular and very censurable. 1 recollect another instance, and the more particularly, perhaps, because it in some measure bore on myself.  Among the midnight appointments of Mr. Adams, were commissions to some federal justices of the peace for Alexandria.  These were signed and sealed by him, but not delivered.  I found them on the table of the department of State, on my entrance into office, and 1 forbade their delivery.  Marbury, named in one of them, applied to the Supreme Court for a Mandamus to the Secretary of State (Mr. Madison), to deliver the commission intended for him.  The Court determined at once, that being an original process, they had no cognizance of it; and there the question before them was ended.  But the Chief Justice went on to lay down what the law would be, had they jurisdiction of the case; to wit, that they should command the delivery.

The object was clearly to instruct any other court having the jurisdiction, what they should do, if Marbury should apply to them.  Besides the impropriety of this gratuitous interference, could any thing exceed the perversion of law?  For if there is any principle of law never yet contradicted, it is that delivery is one of the essentials to the validity of a deed.  Although signed and sealed, yet as long as it remains in the hands of the party himself, it is in fieri only, it is not a deed, and can be made so only by its delivery.  In the hands of a third person it may be made an escrow.  But whatever is in the executive offices is certainly deemed to be in the hands of the President; and, in this case, was actually in my hands, because, when I countermanded them, there was as yet no Secretary of State.  Yet this case of Marbury and Madison is continually cited by bench and bar, as if it were settled law, without any animadversion on its being merely an obiter dissertation of the Chief Justice.

It may be impracticable to lay down any general formula of words which shall decide at once, and with precision, in every case, this limit of jurisdiction.  But there are two canons which will guide us safely in most of the cases. 1.  The capital and leading object of the constitution was, to leave with the States all authorities which respected their own citizens only, and to transfer to the United States those which respected citizens of foreign or other States:  to make us several as to ourselves, but one as to all others.  In the latter case, then, constructions should lean to the general jurisdiction, if the words will bear it; and in favor of the States in the former, if possible to be so construed.  And indeed, between citizens and citizens of the same State, and under their own laws, I know but a single case in which a jurisdiction is given to the General Government.  That is, where any thing but gold or silver is made a lawful tender, or the obligation of contracts is