form of the oaths of the judges, 1 Hening’s Stat.
169, 187; of the Governor, ib. 504; in the act for
a provisional government, ib. 372; in the preamble
to the laws of 1661-2; the uniform current of opinions
and decisions; and in the general recognition of all
our statutes framed on that basis. But the state
of the English law at the date of our emigration,
constituted the system adopted here. We may doubt,
therefore, the propriety of quoting in our courts English
authorities subsequent to that adoption; still more,
the admission of authorities posterior to the Declaration
of Independence, or rather to the accession of that
King, whose reign, ab initio, was that very
tissue of wrongs which rendered the Declaration at
length necessary. The reason for it had inception
at least as far back as the commencement of his reign.
This relation to the beginning of his reign, would
add the advantage of getting us rid of all Mansfield’s
innovations, or civilizations of the common law.
For however I admit the superiority of the civil, over
the common law code, as a system of perfect justice,
yet an incorporation of the two would be like Nebuchadnezzar’s
image of metals and clay, a thing without cohesion
of parts. The only natural improvement of the
common law, is through its homogeneous ally, the chancery,
in which new principles are to be examined, concocted,
and digested. But when, by repeated decisions
and modifications, they are rendered pure and certain,
they should be transferred by statute to the courts
of common law, and placed within the pale of juries.
The exclusion from the courts of the malign influence
of all authorities after the Georgium sidus
became ascendant, would uncanonize Blackstone, whose
book, although the most elegant and best digested
of our law catalogue, has been perverted more than
all others to the degeneracy of legal science.
A student finds there a smattering of every thing,
and his indolence easily persuades him, that if he
understands that book, he is master of the whole body
of the law. The distinction between these and
those who have drawn their stores from the deep and
rich mines of Coke’s Littleton, seems well understood
even by the unlettered common people, who apply the
appellation of Blackstone-lawyers to these ephemeral
insects of the law.
Whether we should undertake to reduce the common law, our own, and so much of the English statutes as we have adopted, to a text, is a question of transcendant difficulty. It was discussed at the first meeting of the committee of the revised code, in 1776, and decided in the negative, by the opinions of Wythe, Mason, and myself, against Pendleton and Thomas Lee. Pendleton proposed to take Blackstone for that text, only purging him of what was inapplicable, or unsuitable to us. In that case, the meaning of every word of Blackstone would have become a source of litigation, until it had been settled by repeated legal decisions. And to come at that meaning, we should have had produced,