will be faithfully preserved during his and my joint lives; and those into whose hands my papers will fall at my death will be equally worthy of confidence.  When the death of the author, or his living consent shall permit the world to know their benefactor, both his and my papers will furnish the evidence.  In the mean time, the many important truths the works so solidly establishes, will, I hope, make it the political rudiment of the young, and manual of our older citizens.

One of its doctrines, indeed, the preference of a plural over a singular executive, will probably not be assented to here.  When our present government was first established, we had many doubts on this question, and many leanings towards a supreme executive council.  It happened that at that time the experiment of such an one was commenced in France, while the single executive was under trial here.  We watched the motions and effects of these two rival plans, with an interest and anxiety proportioned to the importance of a. choice between them.  The experiment in France failed after a short course, and not from any circumstance peculiar to the times or nation, but from those internal jealousies and dissensions in the Directory, which will ever arise among men equal in power, without a principal to decide and control their differences.  We had tried a similar experiment in 1784, by establishing a committee of the States, composed of a member from every State, then thirteen, to exercise the executive functions during the recess of Congress.  They fell immediately into schisms and dissensions, which became at length so inveterate as to render all co-operation among them impracticable:  they dissolved themselves, abandoning the helm of government, and it continued without a head, until Congress met the ensuing winter.  This was then imputed to the temper of two or three individuals; but the wise ascribed it to the nature of man.  The failure of the French Directory, and from the same cause, seems to have authorized a belief that the form of a plurality, however promising in theory, is impracticable with men constituted with the ordinary passions.  While the tranquil and steady tenor of our single executive, during a course of twenty-two years of the most tempestuous times the history of the world has ever presented, gives a rational hope that this important problem is at length solved.  Aided by the counsels of a cabinet of Heads of departments, originally four, but now five, with whom the President consults, either singly or all together, he has the benefit of their wisdom and information, brings their views to one centre, and produces an unity of action and direction in all the branches of the government.  The excellence of this construction of the executive power has already manifested itself here under very opposite circumstances.  During the administration of our first President, his cabinet of four members was equally divided, by as marked an opposition of principle, as monarchism