the undertaking to change the State laws of evidence
in the State courts by certain parts of the stamp-act,
&c. &c. have been solitary, inconsequential, timid
things, in comparison with the audacious, barefaced,
and sweeping pretension to a system of law for the
United States, without the adoption of their legislature,
and so infinitely beyond their power to adopt.
If this assumption be yielded to, the State courts
may be shut up, as there will then be nothing to hinder
citizens of the same State suing each other in the
federal courts in every case, as on a bond for instance,
because the common law obliges payment of it, and
the common law they say is their law. I am happy
you have taken up the subject; and I have carefully
perused and considered the notes you enclosed, and
find but a single paragraph which I do not approve.
It is that wherein (page 2) you say, that laws being
emanations from the legislative department, and, when
once enacted, continuing in force from a presumption
that their will so continues, that that presumption
fails, and the laws of course fall, on the destruction
of that legislative department. I do not think
this is the true bottom on which laws and the administering
them rest. The whole body of the nation is the
sovereign legislative, judiciary, and executive power
for itself. The inconvenience of meeting to exercise
these powers in person, and their inaptitude to exercise
them, induce them to appoint special organs to declare
their legislative will, to judge, and to execute it.
It is the will of the nation which makes the law obligatory;
it is their will which creates or annihilates the
organ which is to declare and announce it. They
may do it by a single person, as an Emperor of Russia
(constituting his declarations evidence of their will),
or by a few persons, as the aristocracy of Venice,
or by a complication of councils, as in our former
regal government, or our present republican one.
The law being law because it is the will of the nation,
is not changed by their changing the organ through
which they choose to announce their future will; no
more than the acts I have done by one attorney lose
their obligation by my changing or discontinuing that
attorney. This doctrine has been, in a certain
degree, sanctioned by the federal executive.
For it is precisely that on which the continuance of
obligation from our treaty with France was established,
and the doctrine was particularly developed in a letter
to Gouverneur Morris, written with the approbation
of President Washington and his cabinet. Mercer
once prevailed on the Virginia Assembly to declare
a different doctrine in some resolutions. These
met universal disapprobation in this, as well as the
other States, and if I mistake not, a subsequent Assembly
did something to do away the authority of their former
unguarded resolutions. In this case, as in all
others, the true principle will be quite as effectual
to establish the just deductions. Before the
revolution, the nation of Virginia had, by the organs