Th: Jefferson.
LETTER CCXVIII.—TO JAMES MONROE, September 7, 1797
THOMAS JEFFERSON TO JAMES MONROE.
Monticello, September 7, 1797.
The doubt which you suggest as to our jurisdiction over the case of the Grand Jury vs. Cabell had occurred to me, and naturally occurs on first view of the question. But I knew, that to send the petition to the House of Representatives in Congress, would make bad worse; that a majority of that House would pass a vote of approbation. On examination of the question, too, it appeared to me that we could maintain the authority of our own government over it.
A right of free correspondence between citizen and citizen, on their joint interests, whether public or private, and under whatsoever laws these interests arise (to wit, of the State, of Congress, of France, Spain, or Turkey), is a natural right: it is not the gift of any municipal law, either of England, of Virginia, or of Congress: but in common with all our other natural rights, it is one of the objects for the protection of which society is formed, and municipal laws established.
The courts of this commonwealth (and among them the General Court, as a court of impeachment) are originally competent to the cognizance of all infractions of the rights of one citizen by another citizen: and they still retain all their judiciary cognizances not expressly alienated by the federal constitution.
The federal constitution alienates from them all cases arising, 1st, under the constitution; 2ndly, under the laws of Congress; 3rdly, under treaties, &c. But this right of free correspondence, whether with a public representative in General Assembly, in Congress, in France, in Spain, or with a private one charged with pecuniary trust, or with a private friend, the object of our esteem, or any other, has not been given to us under, 1st, the federal constitution; 2ndly, any law of Congress; or 3rdly, any treaty; but, as before observed, by nature. It is therefore not alienated, but remains under the protection of our courts.