The British treaty has been formally, at length, laid before Congress.  All America is a tiptoe to see what the House of Representatives will decide on it.  We conceive the constitutional doctrine to be, that though the President and Senate have the general power of making treaties, yet wherever they include in a treaty matters confided by the constitution to the three branches of legislature, an act of legislation will be requisite to confirm these articles, and that the House of Representatives, as one branch of the legislature, are perfectly free to pass the act or to refuse it, governing themselves by their own judgment whether it is for the good of their constituents to let the treaty go into effect or not.  On the precedent now to be set will depend the future construction of our constitution, and whether the powers of legislation shall be transferred from the President, Senate, and House of Representatives, to the President and Senate, and Piamingo or any-other Indian, Algerine, or other chief.  It is fortunate that the first decision is to be in a case so palpably atrocious, as to have been predetermined by all America.  The appointment of Elsworth Chief Justice, and Chase one of the judges, is doubtless communicated to you.  My friendly respects to Mrs. Monroe.  Adieu affectionately.

Th:  Jefferson.

LETTER CXCII.—­TO JAMES MADISON, March 27,1796

TO JAMES MADISON.

Monticello, March 27,1796.

Dear Sir,

I am much pleased with Mr. Gallatin’s speech in Bache’s paper of March the 14th.  It is worthy of being printed at the end of the Federalist, as the only rational commentary on the part of the constitution to which it relates.  Not that there may not be objections, and difficult ones, to it, and which I shall be glad to see his answers to; but if they are never answered, they are more easily to be gulped down than those which lie to the doctrines of his opponents, which do in fact annihilate the whole of the powers given by the constitution to the legislature.  According to the rule established by usage and common sense, of construing one part of the instrument by another, the objects on which the President and Senate may exclusively act by treaty are much reduced, but the field on which they may act with the sanction of the legislature, is large enough:  and I see no harm in rendering their sanction necessary, and not much harm in annihilating the whole treaty-making power, except as to making peace.  If you decide in favor of your right to refuse co-operation in any case of treaty, I should wonder on what occasion it is to be used, if not in one where the rights, the interest, the honor, and faith of our nation are so grossly sacrificed; where a faction has entered into a conspiracy with the enemies of their country to chain down the legislature at the feet of both; where the whole mass of your constituents have condemned this work in the most unequivocal manner,