Th:  Jefferson.

     [The letter of the Attorney General, referred to in the
     preceding.]

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

Philadelphia, April 12, 1793.

Sir,

You will perceive from the two letters marked A. and B. of which I enclose copies, that the subject of Mr. Pagan has been for some time in my view.  The former of those letters being intended for you, and containing a summary of facts, I determined to show it to Mr. Tilghman, who was Pagan’s counsel, before it was sent to you, in order that he might correct any misstatement.  This produced the latter letter from him to me; and I have thought it more advisable to forward both of them to you even in the unfinished state of my own, than to reduce the case into a form which might be supposed to be less accurate.

As I do not discover an essential difference between Mr. Tilghman and myself, I shall not discuss any seeming variance, but proceed upon his ideas.

It is too obvious to require a diffusive exposition, that the application for a writ of error was not only prudent, but a duty in Pagan.  To this Mr. Tilghman explicitly assents, when he says, that he was perfectly ’satisfied of the prudence of applying for the writ of error, as Pagan could not complain of a defect of justice, until he had tried the writ of error and found that mode ineffectual.’  This remark becomes the more important, as it manifests that the process was not suggested as an expedient for shifting any burthen from the government.  Indeed I may with truth add, that the proceedings, taken collectively, appeared to me to present a sufficient intimation of the main question, to serve as a ground of decision.

However, take the case under either aspect; as excluding the consideration of the main question by an omission in the pleadings and record; or as exhibiting it fully to the cognizance of the court.

It never was pretended that a writ of error ought to have been granted, unless the matter was apparent on the record.  Whose office was it to make it thus apparent.  Of the attorney who managed the pleadings.  If, therefore, he has failed to do so, we may presume that he considered the ground untenable, or was guilty of inattention.  Either presumption would be fatal to a citizen of the United States; and the condition of a foreigner cannot create a new measure in the administration of justice.  It is moreover certain, that those who have been consulted on Pagan’s behalf, as well as others, have seriously doubted whether a cause, which has been pursued to the extent which his had reached before the commencement of our new government, was susceptible of federal relief.