instead of ‘my estate.’  It has long been confessed in the courts, that the first decision, that a devise of lands to a person without words of inheritance, should carry an estate for life only, was an absurd decision, founded on feudal principles, after feudal ideas had long been lost by the unlettered writers of their own wills:  and it has often been said, that were the matter to begin again, it should be decided that such a devise should carry a fee simple, as every body is sensible testators intend, by these expressions.  The courts, therefore, circumscribe the authority of this chain of decisions, all hanging on the first link, as much as possible; and they avail themselves of every possible circumstance which may render any new case unlike the old one, and authorize them to conform their judgments to common sense, and the will of the testator.  Hence they decide, that in a devise of ’my estate at M.’ to such a one, without words of inheritance, the word estate is descriptive of the duration of the interest bequeathed, as well as its locality.  From the same desire of getting back into the paths of common sense, they would not suffer the particle ‘the’ instead of ‘my’, to make a difference.  ‘My estate at M.’ means not only my lands at M., but my fee simple in them.  ‘The estate at M.’ means not only ’the lands the testator holds at M., but the fee simple he has in them.’  Another objection will be made, perhaps, viz. that the testator devises in the same clause his estate called Marrow-bone, his tract called Horse-pasture, and his tract called Poison-field; that it is probable he intended to give the same interest in all; and as it is confessed that the word tract conveys but an estate for life, we must conclude that the word estate was meant to convey the same.  I should reverse the argument, and say, as it confessed the word estate, conveys an estate in fee simple, we must conclude the word tract was meant to convey the same; that this conclusion coincides with the wishes of the courts, as bringing them back to what is right and consentaneous to the intention of the testator, as furnishing them a circumstance to distinguish the case from the original one, and withdraw it from its authority; whereas, the contrary conclusion tends to lead them further from the meaning of testators, and to fix them in error.

But I perceive that my wishes to see the weight of no objection where you are interested, are leading me to write an argument, where I had promised I would say only a word.  I will, therefore, talk the subject over with you at Monticello, or Pen-park.  I have asked of Congress a leave of five or six months’ absence next year, that I may carry my daughters home, and assist in the arrangement of my affairs.  I shall pass two of the months at Monticello, that is to say, either June and July, or July and August, according to the time I may sail, which I hope will be in April:  and then go on to New York and Boston, from whence I shall embark again for Europe, so as