experience for the basis of my calculation:  though we know, from our own experience, that we can do in this way for pounds lawful, what costs them pounds sterling.  Were we to charge all this to the Algerine war, it would amount to little more than we must pay if we buy peace.  But as it is proper and necessary, that we should establish a small marine force (even were we to buy a peace from the Algerines), and as that force, laid up in our dock-yard, would cost us half as much annually as if kept in order for service, we have a right to say, that only twenty-two thousand and five hundred pounds sterling, per annum, should be charged to the Algerine war. 6.  It will be as effectual.  To all the mismanagements of Spain and Portugal, urged to show that war against those people is ineffectual, I urge a single fact to prove the contrary, where there is any management.  About forty years ago, the Algerines having broke their treaty with France, this court sent Monsieur de Massiac, with one large and two small frigates:  he blockaded the harbor of Algiers three months, and they subscribed to the terms he proposed.  If it be admitted, however, that war, on the fairest prospects, is still exposed to uncertainties, I weigh against this the greater uncertainty of the duration of a peace bought with money, from such a people, from a Dey eighty years old, and by a nation who, on the hypothesis of buying peace, is to have no power on the sea to enforce an observance of it.

So far I have gone on the supposition, that the whole weight of this war would rest on us.  But, 1.  Naples will join us.  The character of their naval minister (Acton), his known sentiments with respect to the peace Spain is officiously trying to make for them, and his dispositions against the Algerines, give the best grounds to believe it. 2.  Every principle of reason assures,us, that Portugal will join us.  I state this as taking for granted, what all seem to believe, that they will not be at peace with Algiers.  I suppose, then, that a convention might be formed between Portugal, Naples, and the United States, by which the burthen of the war might be quotaed on them, according to their respective wealth; and the term of it should be, when Algiers should subscribe to a peace with all three on equal terms.  This might be left open for other nations to accede to, and many, if not most of the powers of Europe (except France, England, Holland, and Spain, if her peace be made), would sooner or later enter into the confederacy, for the sake of having their peace with the piratical States guarantied by the whole.  I suppose, that, in this case, our proportion of force would not be the half of what I first calculated on.