they must be rendered less interesting by a necessity of change.  No foreign power, nor domestic party, will waste their blood and money to elect a person, who must go out at the end of a short period.  The power of removing every fourth year by the vote of the people, is a power which they will not exercise, and if they were disposed to exercise it, they would not be permitted.  The King of Poland is removable every day by the diet.  But they never remove him.  Nor would Russia, the Emperor, &c. permit them to do it.  Smaller objections are, the appeals on matters of fact as well as law; and the binding all persons, legislative, executive, and judiciary, by oath, to maintain that constitution.  I do not pretend to decide, what would be the best method of procuring the establishment of the manifold good things in this constitution, and of getting rid of the bad.  Whether by adopting it, in hopes of future amendment; or, after it shall have been duly weighed and canvassed by the people, after seeing the parts they generally dislike, and those they generally approve, to say to them, ’We see now what you wish.  You are willing to give to your federal government such and such powers:  but you wish, at the same time, to have such and such fundamental rights secured to you, and certain sources of convulsion taken away.  Be it so.  Send together your deputies again.  Let them establish your fundamental rights by a sacrosanct declaration, and let them pass the parts of the constitution you have approved.  These will give powers to your federal government sufficient for your happiness.’  This is what might be said, and would probably produce a speedy, more perfect, and more permanent form of government.  At all events, I hope you will not be discouraged from making other trials, if the present one should fail.  We are never permitted to despair of the commonwealth.  I have thus told you freely what I like, and what I dislike, merely as a matter of curiosity; for I know it is not in my power to offer matter of information to your judgment, which has been formed after hearing and weighing every thing which the wisdom of man could offer on these subjects.  I own, I am not a friend to a very energetic government.  It is always oppressive.  It places the governors indeed more at their ease, at the expense of the people.  The late rebellion in Massachusetts has given more alarm, than I think it should have done.  Calculate that one rebellion in thirteen States in the course of eleven years, is but one for each State in a century and a half.  No country should be so long without one.  Nor will any degree of power in the hands of government prevent insurrections.  In England, where the hand of power is heavier than with us, there are seldom half a dozen years without an insurrection.  In France, Where it is still heavier, but less despotic, as Montesquieu supposes, than in some other countries, and where there are always two or three hundred thousand men ready to crush insurrections, there have been