might do for the audience to which it was addressed:  but it is surely a gratis dictum, the reverse of which might just as well be said; and it is opposed by strong inferences from the body of the instrument, as well as from the omission of the clause of our present Confederation, which had made the reservation in express terms.  It was hard to conclude, because there has been a want of uniformity among the States as to the cases triable by jury, because some have been so incautious as to dispense with this mode of trial in certain cases, therefore the more prudent States shall be reduced to the same level of calamity.  It would have been much more just and wise to have concluded the other way, that as most of the States had preserved with jealousy this sacred palladium of liberty, those who had wandered, should be brought back to it:  and to have established general right rather than general wrong.  For I consider all the ill as established, which maybe established.  I have a right to nothing, which another has a right to take away; and Congress will have a right to take away trials by jury in all civil cases.  Let me add, that a bill of rights is what the people are entitled to against every government on earth, general or particular; and what no just government should refuse, or rest on inference.

The second feature I dislike, and strongly dislike, is the abandonment, in every instance, of the principle of rotation in office, and most particularly in the case of the President.  Reason and experience tell us, that the first magistrate will always be re-elected if he may be re-elected.  He is then an officer for life.

This once observed, it becomes of so much consequence to certain nations, to have a friend or a foe at the head of our affairs, that they will interfere with money and with arms.  A Galloman, or an Angloman, will be supported by the nation he befriends.  If once elected, and at a second or third election outvoted by one or two votes, he will pretend false votes, foul play, hold possession of the reins of government, be supported by the States voting for him, especially if they be the central ones, lying in a compact body themselves, and separating their opponents; and they will be aided by one nation in Europe, while the majority are aided by another.  The election of a President of America, some years hence, will be much more interesting to certain nations of Europe, than ever the election of a King of Poland was.  Reflect on all the instances in history, ancient and modern, of elective monarchies, and say, if they do not give foundation for my fears; the Roman Emperors, the Popes while they were of any importance, the German Emperors till they became hereditary in practice, the Kings of Poland, the Deys of the Ottoman dependencies.  It may be said, that if elections are to be attended with these disorders, the less frequently they are repeated the better.  But experience says, that to free them from disorder,