Perhaps it might have been better, when they were forming the federal constitution, to have assimilated it as much as possible to the particular constitutions of the States.  All of these have distributed the legislative, executive, and judiciary powers into different departments.  In the federal constitution the judiciary powers are separated from the others; but the legislative and executive are both exercised by Congress.  A means of amending this defect has been thought of.  Congress having a power to establish what committees of their own body they please, and to arrange among them the distribution of their business, they might, on the first day of their annual meeting, appoint an executive committee consisting of a member from each State, and refer to them all executive business which should occur during their session; confining themselves to what is of a legislative nature, that is to say, to the heads described in the ninth article, as of the competence of nine States only, and to such other questions as should lead to the establishment of general rules.  The journal of this committee of the preceding day might be read the next morning in Congress, and considered as approved, unless a vote was demanded on a particular article, and that article changed.  The sessions of Congress would then be short, and when they separated, the Confederation authorizes the appointment of a committee of the States which would naturally succeed to the business of the executive committee.  The legislative business would be better done, because the attention of the members would not be interrupted by the details of execution; and the executive business would be better done, because business of this nature is better adapted to small than great bodies.  A monarchical head should confide the execution of its will to departments, consisting each of a plurality of hands, who would warp that will as much as possible towards wisdom and moderation, the two qualities it generally wants.  But a republican head, founding its decrees originally in these two qualities, should commit them to a single hand for execution, giving them thereby a promptitude which republican proceedings generally want.  Congress could not, indeed, confide their executive business to a smaller number than a committee consisting of a member from each State.  This is necessary to insure the confidence of the Union.  But it would be gaining a great deal to reduce the executive head to thirteen, and to relieve themselves of those details.  This, however, has as yet been the subject of private conversations only.

3.  A succinct account of paper money, in America?