* By the stat. 21.Tac. 1. c. 27. and Act Ass. 1710, c. 12. concealment by the mother of the death of a bastard child is made murder.  In justification of this, it is said, that shame is a feeling which operates so strongly on the mind, as frequently to induce the mother of such a child to murder it, in order to conceal her disgrace.  The act of concealment, therefore, proves she was influenced by shame, and that influence produces a presumption that she murdered the child.  The effect of this law, then, is, to make what, in its nature, is only presumptive evidence of a murder, conclusive of that fact.  To this I answer, 1.  So many children die before, or soon after birth, that to presume all those murdered who are found dead, is a presumption which will lead us oftener wrong than right, and consequently would shed more blood than it would save. 2.  If the child were born dead, the mother would naturally choose rather to conceal it, in hopes of still keeping a good character in the neighborhood.  So that the act of concealment is far from proving the guilt of murder on the mother. 3.  If shame be a powerful affection of the mind, is not parental love also?  Is it not the strongest affection known?  Is it not greater than even that of self- preservation?  While we draw presumptions from shame, one affection of the mind, against the life of the prisoner, should we not give some weight to presumptions from parental love, an affection at least as strong in favor of life?  If concealment of the fact is a presumptive evidence of murder, so strong as to overbalance all other evidence that may possibly be produced to take away the presumption, why not trust the force of this incontestable presumption to the jury, who are, in a regular course, to hear presumptive, as well as positive testimony?  If the presumption, arising from the act of concealment, may be destroyed by proof positive or circumstantial to the contrary, why should the legislature preclude that contrary proof?  Objection.  The crime is difficult to prove, being usually committed in secret.  Answer.  But circumstantial proof will do; for example, marks of violence, the behavior, countenance, &c. of the prisoner, &c.  And if conclusive proof be difficult to be obtained, shall we therefore fasten irremovably upon equivocal proof?  Can we change the nature of what is contestable, and make it incontestable?  Can we make that conclusive which God and nature have made inconclusive?  Solon made no law against, parricide, supposing it impossible any one could be guilty of it; and the Persians, from the same opinion, adjudged all who killed their reputed parents to be bastards:  and although parental, be yet stronger than filial affection, we admit saticide proved on the most equivocal testimony, whilst they rejected all proof of an act, certainly not more repugnant to nature, as of a thing impossible, improvable.  See Beccaria, Sec. 31.

Whosoever committeth murder by poisoning, shall suffer death by poison.