General Wheeler said the fire was very hot for about an hour, and “at 8.30 sent a courier to General Lawton informing him that he was engaged with a larger force of the enemy than was anticipated, and asked that his force be sent forward on the Sevilla road as quickly as possible.” ("In Cuba With Shafter,” p. 83.) General Lawton, however, with the true instinct of a soldier had already sent orders to General Chaffee to move forward with the First Brigade.  The Second Brigade was also in readiness to move and the men of the Twenty-fifth were expecting to go forward to take a position on the right and if possible a little to the rear of the Spanish entrenchments in order to cut off their retreat.  The rapid movements of the cavalry division, however, rendered this unnecessary, and the routing of the foe gave to the Americans an open country and cleared the field for the advance on Santiago.  The first battle had been fought, and the Americans had been victorious, but not without cost.  Sixteen men had been killed and fifty-two wounded.  In Colonel Wood’s regiment eight had been killed and thirty-four wounded; in the First Cavalry, seven killed and eight wounded; in the Tenth Cavalry, one killed and ten wounded.  The percentage of losses to the whole strength of the several organizations engaged was as follows:  Rough Riders, over 8 per cent.; First Cavalry, over 6 per cent.; Tenth Cavalry, 5 per cent.  But if we take those on the firing line as the base the rate per cent. of losses among the regulars would be doubled, while that of the volunteers would remain the same.

The strength of the enemy in this battle is given in the Spanish official reports, according to Lieutenant Miley, at about five hundred, and their losses are put at nine killed and twenty-seven wounded.  At the time of the fight it was supposed to be much larger.  General Young’s report places the estimates at 2,000, and adds “that it has since been learned from Spanish sources to have been 2,500.  The Cuban military authorities claim the Spanish strength was 4,000.”  These figures are doubtless too high.  The force overtaken at Las Guasimas was the same force that evacuated Siboney at the approach of Lawton and the force with which the Cubans had fought on the morning of the 23rd.  It may have consisted solely of the garrison from Siboney, although it is more probable that it included also those from Daiquiri and Jutici, as it is quite certain that all these troops proceeded toward Santiago over the same road.  The force at Siboney had been given by the Cubans at 600, at Daiquiri at 300, and at Jutici at 150.  If these had concentrated and the figures were correct, the Spanish force at Guasimas was upwards of 1,000.  If, however, it was the force from Siboney alone, it was about as the Spanish official report gives it.  On this latter basis, however, the losses are out of proportion, for while the attacking party lost a little less than 7 per cent. of its entire strength in killed and wounded, the losses of the